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Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection

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Author Info
Jean-Jacques Laffont (IDEI, ARQADE, GREMAQ, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse)

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Abstract

In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lending contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mech- anisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners\' performances. However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed, group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms (which elicit only the borrower\'s own private information) and remain useful with extended revelation mechanisms.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano in its series Development Working Papers with number 147.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2000
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Handle: RePEc:csl:devewp:147

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Related research
Keywords: Group lending; adverse selection; collusion; development;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," IDEI Working Papers 20, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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  2. Khandker, S.R. & Khalily, B. & Khan, Z., 1995. "Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability," World Bank - Discussion Papers 306, World Bank.
  3. de Aghion, Beatriz Armendariz & Gollier, Christian, 2000. "Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(465), pages 632-43, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Pitt, M.M. & Khandker, S.R., 1996. "Household and Intrahousehold Impact of the Grameen Bank and Similar Targeted Credit Programs in Bangladesh," World Bank - Discussion Papers 320, World Bank.
  6. Riordan, Michael H. & Sappington, David E. M., 1988. "Optimal contracts with public ex post information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 189-199, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Discussion Papers 98-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rai, Ashok S. & Klonner, Stefan, 2007. "Cosigners Help," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 18, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Columba, Francesco & Leonardo, Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio , Mistrulli, 2008. "Firms as monitor of other firms: mutual guarantee institutions and SME finance," MPRA Paper 14032, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jonathan Conning, 2005. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 407, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. M. Kugler & R. Oppes, 2005. "Collateral and Risk Sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program," Working Paper CRENoS 200509, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rafael Gomez & Eric Santor, 2003. "Do Peer Group Members Outperform Individual Borrowers? A Test of Peer Group Lending Using Canadian Micro-Credit Data," Working Papers 03-33, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
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