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Trading for bailouts

Author

Listed:
  • Ahnert, Toni
  • Machado, Caio
  • Pereira, Ana

Abstract

Government interventions such as bailouts are often implemented in times of high uncertainty. Policymakers may therefore rely on information from financial markets to guide their decisions. We study a model in which a policymaker learns from market activity and traders have high private stakes in the intervention. We discuss how the presence of such traders affects intervention outcomes, and show that it reduces market informativeness and the efficiency of bailouts. Regarding normative implications, we show that a higher social cost of interventions and a gradual implementation of assistance can improve market informativeness and raise overall welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahnert, Toni & Machado, Caio & Pereira, Ana, 2023. "Trading for bailouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17812
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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