A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions
Abstract
We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail. Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure that LFIs do not default on either their deposits or their derivative contracts, we require that they maintain a capital cushion sufficiently great that their own credit default swap price stays below a threshold level. If this level is violated the LFI regulator forces the LFI to issue equity until the CDS price moves back below the threshold. If this does not happen within a predetermined period of time, the regulator intervenes. We show that this mechanism ensures that LFIs are solvent with probability one, while preserving the disciplinary effects of debt.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7298.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7298
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Order Information:
Email:
For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Related research
Keywords: banks; Capital requirement; too big to fail;Other versions of this item:
- Luigi Zingales, 2011. "A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 453-490.
- Luigi Zingales & Oliver Hart, 2009. "A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions," Working Papers 2009.124, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2009-06-17 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2009-06-17 (Business Economics)
- NEP-REG-2009-06-17 (Regulation)
- NEP-RMG-2009-06-17 (Risk Management)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John B. Taylor & John C. Williams, 2009.
"A Black Swan in the Money Market,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 58-83, January.
- John B. Taylor & John C. Williams, 2008. "A black swan in the money market," Working Paper Series 2008-04, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- John B. Taylor & John C. Williams, 2008. "A Black Swan in the Money Market," NBER Working Papers 13943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
- Scott, Hal S. (ed.), 2005. "Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195169713, December.
- Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-54, May-June.
- Hull, John & Predescu, Mirela & White, Alan, 2004. "The relationship between credit default swap spreads, bond yields, and credit rating announcements," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 2789-2811, November.
- Philip Bond & Itay Goldstein & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2010. "Market-Based Corrective Actions," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(2), pages 781-820, February.
- Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Charles Goodhart, 2010. "¿Cómo deberíamos regular el capital bancario y los productos financieros? ¿Cuál es el papel de los “testamentos en vida”?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 12(23), pages 85-109, July-Dece.
- Larry D. Wall, 2010.
"Prudential discipline for financial firms: micro, macro, and market structures,"
Working Paper
2010-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Larry D. Wall, 2010. "Prudential Discipline for Financial Firms: Micro, Macro, and Market Structures," Working Papers id:3040, eSocialSciences.
- Wall, Larry D., 2009. "Prudential Discipline for Financial Firms: Micro, Macro, and Market Structures," ADBI Working Papers 176, Asian Development Bank Institute.
- Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica & Merrouche, Ouarda, 2010.
"Bank capital : lessons from the financial crisis,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
5473, The World Bank.
- Ouarda Merrouche & Enrica Detragiache & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 2010. "Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis," IMF Working Papers 10/286, International Monetary Fund.
- Yehning Chen & Iftekhar Hasan, 2011.
"Subordinated Debt, Market Discipline, and Bank Risk,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(6), pages 1043-1072, 09.
- Chen , Yehning & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2011. "Subordinated debt, market discipline, and bank risk," Research Discussion Papers 20/2011, Bank of Finland.
- Edward Kane, 2010. "Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(3), pages 251-264, September.
- Dietrich, Diemo & Hauck, Achim, 2010. "Government interventions in banking crises: Assessing alternative schemes in a banking model of debt overhang," MPRA Paper 24508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Beck, Thorsten, 2010. "Regulatory Reform After the Crisis: Opportunities and Pitfalls," CEPR Discussion Papers 7733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7298For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

