Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Stephen F. LeRoy & Rish Singhania, 2020. "Deposit insurance and the coexistence of commercial and shadow banks," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 159-194, June.
- Nizar, Muhammad Afdi & Mansur, Alfan, 2019. "Premi Penjaminan Simpanan Berbasis Risiko: Studi Kasus LPS Indonesia [Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premium: A Case Study of Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC)]," MPRA Paper 97894, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Dec 2019.
- repec:zbw:bofitp:2005_007 is not listed on IDEAS
- Huberto M. Ennis & H. S. Malek, 2005. "Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 91(Spr), pages 21-44.
- Chernykh, Lucy & Kotomin, Vladimir, 2022. "Risk-based deposit insurance, deposit rates and bank failures: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
- Antoine Martin, 2003. "A guide to deposit insurance reform," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 88(Q I), pages 29-54.
- Kaelo Mpho Ntwaepelo, 2023. "Bank Stability versus Financial Development: A Generous Deposit Insurer's Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2023-09, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
- Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
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