1. Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2002. "Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Review," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 375-394, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Udry, Christopher, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 495-526, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Gelbach, Jonath B. & Pritchett, Lant H., 1997. "More for the poor is less for the poor : the politics of targeting," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1799, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
6. Jonathan Morduch, 1995. "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1727, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Morduch, J., 1995. "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing," Papers 512, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
   • Morduch, Jonathan, 1995. "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 103-14, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1997. "Trade credit in Zimbabwean manufacturing," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 795-815, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Morduch, Jonathan, 1999. "Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net?," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 187-207, August. [Downloadable!]
10. Varian, H.R., 1989. "Monitoring Agents With Other Agents," Papers 89-18, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
11. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-91, August.
    Other versions:
    • Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," IDEI Working Papers 40, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," Working papers 95-1, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
12. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-90, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Conning, Jonathan, 1999. "Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 51-77, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-46, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Erica Field, 2002. "Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru," Working Papers 180, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies.. [Downloadable!]
16. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Douglas W. Diamond, 1996. "Financial intermediation as delegated monitoring: a simple example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 51-66. [Downloadable!]
19. Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997. "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 709-51, August.
    Other versions:
    • Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1996. "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 1426, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1994. "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification and Growth," Economics Working Papers 98, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
20. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 1998. "Expenditure Decentralization and the Delivery of Public Services in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 90, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
22. Stefan Dercon & Pramila Krishnan, 2000. "In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural Ethiopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(4), pages 688-727, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Fafchamps, Marcel, 2000. "Ethnicity and credit in African manufacturing," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 205-235, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1993. "The Choice Between Public and Private Debt: An Analysis of Post-Deregulation Corporate Financing in Japan," NBER Working Papers 4421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Case, Anne & Deaton, Angus, 1998. "Large Cash Transfers to the Elderly in South Africa," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1330-61, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Anne Case & Angus Deaton, 1996. "Large Cash Transfers to the Elderly in South Africa," NBER Working Papers 5572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Case, A. & Deaton, A., 1996. "Large Cash Transfers to the Elderly in South Africa," Papers 176, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
26. Grimard, Franque, 1997. "Household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties: evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 391-422, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-18, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives And Social Collateral," Papers 152, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
28. Kranton, Rachel E. & Swamy, Anand V., 1999. "The hazards of piecemeal reform: british civil courts and the credit market in colonial India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. Jonathan Conning, 2005. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 407, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
30. Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman & Beck, Thorsten, 2000. "Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 31-77, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman & Beck, Thorsten, 1999. "Financial intermediation and growth : Causality and causes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2059, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    • Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine & Norman Loayza, 1999. "Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 56, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
31. Kimball, Miles S, 1988. "Farmers' Cooperatives as Behavior Toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 224-32, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
32. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1996. "Financing of Investment in Eastern Europe: A Theoretical Perspective," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 205-37.
33. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 351-66, September.
34. Levine, Ross, 2001. "International Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(4), pages 688-702, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
35. Laux, Christian, 2001. "Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 514-26, Autumn.
36. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-91, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Townsend, R.M., 1991. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 91-3, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
    • Robert M. Townsend, . "Risk and Insurance in Village India," University of Chicago - Population Research Center 91-3a, Chicago - Population Research Center.
37. Prescott, Edward Simpson & Townsend, Robert M., 2002. "Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 282-310, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. Jonathan Conning, 2005. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 407, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Marcoul, P. & Veyssiere, L., 2008. "Impact of Supermarket Procurement System on Farmers' Credit Access," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 43862, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]