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The Brokerage of Asymmetric Information

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  • Rodolfo Apreda

Abstract

In this paper we oversee the logic of information sets, firstly handling information and markets in perfect environments and, secondly, dealing with information and markets in imperfect environments, in the context of bounded rationality. Further on, asymmetric information is addressed together with the role of opportunistic behaviour through hidden action, hidden information, the free-rider problem and signaling, expanding on financial accounting and asymmetric information. At last, asymmetric markets are expanded on, reviewing the buyers’ and sellers’ markets so as to handle the performance of intermediaries who stand ready to provide with immediacy and liquidity to buyers and sellers of financial assets. There are two contributions that this paper brings forward: firstly, an intuitive treatment of information sets in the context of mathematical Set Theory so as to make tractable some issues still neglected. Secondly, we claim and develop that a careful assessment of information sets makes headway towards an approach that regards market makers and other intermediaries as brokers of asymmetric information.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 190.

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Date of creation: Jun 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:190

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rodolfo Apreda, 2000. "Differential Rates of Return and Residual Information Sets (A Discrete Approach)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 177, Universidad del CEMA.
  2. Rodolfo Apreda, 2003. "On the Extent of Arbitrage Constraints within Transaction Algebras (A non-standard approach)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 239, Universidad del CEMA.
  3. Rodolfo Apreda, 2005. "Public Governance. A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 297, Universidad del CEMA.
  4. Rodolfo Apreda, 2007. "The rise of corporate governance brokers and how they trade in asymmetric information," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 341, Universidad del CEMA.
  5. Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "Incremental cash flows, information sets and conflicts of interest," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 220, Universidad del CEMA.
  6. Rodolfo Apreda, 2004. "Differential rates, residual information sets and transactional algebras," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 256, Universidad del CEMA.
  7. Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "How corporate governance and globalization can run afoul of the law and good practices in business: The Enron's disgraceful affair," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 225, Universidad del CEMA.
  8. Rodolfo Apreda, 2008. "A new linkage between corporate and public governance through the lens of incremental cash flows," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 374, Universidad del CEMA.

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