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The rise of corporate governance brokers and how they trade in asymmetric information

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  • Rodolfo Apreda

Abstract

This paper sets forth that governance brokerage can be regarded as a natural outgrowth of the actual practice of Corporate Governance. To lay the foundations of our subject, firstly we delve into the dual nature of any transaction. Then we move on to define what the expression “governance broker” means, underlining five professional arrangements from which governance intermediation can be achieved. Next, it is shown how trade splits up economic agents’ information sets, giving rise to the brokerage of asymmetric information. Afterwards, we account for the ways a governance broker meets his goals in dyadic and polyadic relationships, bringing forward distinctive courses of action: clinical assistance, consultancy to foster growth and value, governance engineering, tutoring on global standards of governance, mediation in conflicts of interests, even international intermediation.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodolfo Apreda, 2007. "The rise of corporate governance brokers and how they trade in asymmetric information," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 341, Universidad del CEMA.
    • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:341
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    File URL: https://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/341.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Scitovsky, Tibor, 1990. "The Benefits of Asymmetric Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 135-148, Winter.
    2. Daniel F. Spulber, 1996. "Market Microstructure and Intermediation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 135-152, Summer.
    3. Rodolfo Apreda, 2004. "Differential rates, residual information sets and transactional algebras," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 256, Universidad del CEMA.
    4. Rodolfo Apreda, 2005. "How trade splits up information sets and dealers carry out their brokerage of asymmetric information," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 288, Universidad del CEMA.
    5. Rodolfo Apreda, 2001. "The Brokerage of Asymmetric Information," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 190, Universidad del CEMA.
    6. Rodolfo Apreda, 2005. "Public Governance. A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 297, Universidad del CEMA.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodolfo Apreda, 2007. "How the logic and pragmatics of sinking funds play a part in corporate governance," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 351, Universidad del CEMA.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    governance broker; information sets; dyadic and polyadic relationships; brokerage of asymmetric information; corporate governance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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