n this paper we set forth a new perspective from which to understand and measure the brokerage of asymmetric information that intermediaries usually carry out. Firstly, we deal with partitions of a given set so as to lay grounds to our line of research. Secondly, we argue that trade splits up imperfect information sets, over which traders try to negotiate and profit, but also hide their opportunistic behavior from their counterparts. Next, the brokerage of asymmetric information is framed so as to stress the fact that any exchange is dual, entailing not only bargaining property rights but also information value. Lastly, we bring to light the linkage between differential rates, residual information sets and trading environments, which seems to be a functional toolkit for assessing how much asymmetric information is brokered eventually.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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