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Corporate Governance

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Author Info
Luigi Zingales
Abstract

This essay summarizes my own personal view of what corporate governance is about. I" argue that it makes sense to discuss corporate governance only in an incomplete contract world. " In this world, the notion of corporate governance is intrinsically related to the definition of the" firm. In this respect, I review the shortcomings of the existing definitions of the firm and the" possible applications of the idea that the firm is a specific investments" introduced by" Rajan and Zingales (1997a and 1997b). I conclude discussing the limitations of the incomplete" contracts approach to corporate governance.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6309.

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Date of creation: Dec 1997
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6309

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G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
    • Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  5. Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D, 1985. "Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 368-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
  7. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts., 1987. "Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity," Economics Working Papers 8731, University of California at Berkeley.
  8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  10. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  11. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Hellwig, Martin, 1997. "Unternehmensfinanzierung, Unternehmenskontrolle und Ressourcenallokation: Was leistet das Finanzsystem?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  15. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," NBER Working Papers 6368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Paterson J, 2001. "Corporate Governance, The Limits of Rationality and Proceduralisation," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp198, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hubert Ooghe & Veerle De Vuyst, 2001. "The Anglo-Saxon versus the Continental European Corporate Governance Model: Empirical Evidence of Board Composition in Belgium," Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School Working Paper Series 2001-6, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, 2000. "Class Struggle Inside the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination," NBER Working Papers 7945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, 1998. "Objectivity, Control and Adaptability in Corporate Governance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-064/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ekkehart Boehmer, . "Business Groups, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers," Working Papers 1999.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  7. Irena Grosfeld & Thierry Tressel, 2001. "Competition and Corporate Governance : Substitutes or Complements ? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange," DELTA Working Papers 2001-06, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Chisari, Omar O. & Ferro, Gustavo, 2009. "Gobierno Corporativo: los problemas, estado actual de la discusión y un ejercicio de medición para Argentina
    [Corporate Governance: the problems, the current stage of the discussion and a measure    ," MPRA Paper 15630, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Fernando Lefort, 2003. "Gobierno Corporativo: ¿Qué es? y ¿Cómo andamos por casa?," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(120), pages 207-237. [Downloadable!]
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