The Internal Governance of Firms
AbstractWe develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15568.
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Viral V. Acharya & Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2011. "The Internal Governance of Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(3), pages 689-720, 06.
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Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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Other versions of this item:
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
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- Mobbs, Shawn & Raheja, Charu G., 2012. "Internal managerial promotions: Insider incentives and CEO succession," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1337-1353.
- Ginglinger, Edith & Megginson, William & Waxin, Timothée, 2011.
"Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies,"
Journal of Corporate Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 868-887, September.
- Edith Ginglinger & William Megginson & Timothee Waxin, 2011. "Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies," Post-Print halshs-00626310, HAL.
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