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Managerial control inside the firm

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  • Hirota, Shinichi
  • Kawamura, Kohei

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.

Volume (Year): 21 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 324-335

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:21:y:2007:i:3:p:324-335

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622903

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References

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  1. Milgrom, Paul R., 1987. "employment contracts, influence activities and efficient organization design," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt6pf6c5j6, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli, 1999. "Causes and Effects of Corporate Refocusing Programs," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 311-45.
  3. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 19772, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109 Elsevier.
  5. Cable, John R, 1985. "Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West German Banks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 118-32, March.
  6. Osano, Hiroshi, 1996. "Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 1047-1068, July.
  7. Sheard, Paul, 1989. "The main bank system and corporate monitoring and control in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 399-422, May.
  8. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-46, June.
  9. Tufano, Peter, 1996. " Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1097-1137, September.
  10. Hashimoto, Masanori, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 475-82, June.
  11. Smith, Clifford W. & Stulz, René M., 1985. "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(04), pages 391-405, December.
  12. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26.
  13. Jensen, Michael C, 1993. " The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 831-80, July.
  14. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1997. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 191-213, April.
  15. Clifford G. Holderness, 2003. "A survey of blockholders and corporate control," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 51-64.
  16. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  17. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, 2003. "Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 27-50.
  18. Stulz, René M., 1984. "Optimal Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(02), pages 127-140, June.
  19. Kang, Jun-Koo & Shivdasani, Anil, 1997. "Corporate restructuring during performance declines in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 29-65, October.
  20. Berglof, Erik & Perotti, Enrico, 1994. "The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 259-284, October.
  21. Katsuyuki Kubo & Takuji Saito, 2008. "The Relationship Between Financial Incentives For Company Presidents And Firm Performance In Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 401-418.
  22. Denis, David J & Denis, Diane K & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. " Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 135-60, March.
  23. Hanazaki, Masaharu & Horiuchi, Akiyoshi, 2000. "Is Japan's Financial System Efficient?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 61-73, Summer.
  24. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, December.
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