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Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey

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Author Info
John E. Core
Wayne R. Guay
David F. Larcker
Abstract

Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, and government regulators. Similar to much of the corporate finance and corporate governance literature, research on stock-based compensation and incentives has not only generated useful insights, but also produced many contradictory findings. Not surprisingly, many fundamental questions remain unanswered. In this study, the authors synthesize the broad literature on equity-based compensation and executive incentives and highlight topics that seem especially appropriate for future research.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its journal Economic Policy Review.

Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): Apr ()
Pages: 27-50
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2003:i:apr:p:27-50:n:v.9no.1

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Related research
Keywords: Executives ; Stockholders ; Corporate governance;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Gibbons, R. & Murphy, K.J., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns: Theory And Evidence," Working papers 563, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, 2005. "Firm Expansion and CEO Pay," NBER Working Papers 11886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, 2006. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," NBER Working Papers 12068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Butzbach, Olivier & Di Carlo, Ferdinando, 2008. "The effects of stock options accounting regulation on corporate governance: A comparative European study," MPRA Paper 14843, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jackwerth, Jens Carsten & Hodder, James E., 2008. "Managerial Responses to Incentives: Control of Firm Risk, Derivative Pricing Implications, and Outside Wealth Management," MPRA Paper 11643, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kuang, Flora Yu & Qin, Bo, 2006. "Performance-vested stock options and pay-performance sensitivity," Discussion Paper 123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hillegeist, Stephen A. & Peñalva, Fernando, 2004. "Stock option incentives and firm performance," IESE Research Papers D/535, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  7. Marc Chesney & Rajna Gibson, 2008. "Stock options and managers’ incentives to cheat," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 41-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fredrik Andersson & Matthew Freedman & John C. Haltiwanger & Julia Lane & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2006. "Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries?," NBER Working Papers 12435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, 2005. "The Growth of Executive Pay," NBER Working Papers 11443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hamid Mehran & Joshua Rosenberg, 2007. "The effect of employee stock options on bank investment choice, borrowing, and capital," Staff Reports 305, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  11. Riccardo Calcagno & Florian Heider, 2004. "Market Based Compensation, Trading And Liquidity," Business Economics Working Papers wb046224, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa. [Downloadable!]
  12. Fahlenbrach, Rﾃｼdiger & Stulz, Renﾃｩ M., 2008. "Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Galimberti, Jaqueson Kingeski & Cupertino, César Medeiros, 2009. "Explaining earnings persistence: a threshold autoregressive panel unit root approach," MPRA Paper 14237, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Christian Bayer & Carsten Burhop, 2004. "A Corporate Governance Reform as a Natural Experiment for Incentive Contracts," Finance 0407002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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