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Two-Part Share Contracts, Risk, and the Life Cycle of Stars: Some Empirical Results from Motion Picture Contracts

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Author Info
Darlene Chisholm
Abstract

What determines the market value of a star? This paper examines the size of fixed payments to leading actors in the U.S. motion picture industry from a sample of contracts between 1959 and 1989. Competing explanations for the size of compensation, including rent capture, risk sharing, signalling, and portfolio optimization by studio executives are explored. The size of fixed payment across all contract types moves with an actor's history of participating in top-20 grossing films over the past five, ten, fifteen, and twenty films. Further, the impact of past top-20 successes is enhanced by the length of the actor's career. When contracts are divided into those with both fixed payments and share payments and those with only fixed payments, the fixed payment in two-part share contracts is influenced to some extent by risk concerns, in addition to the actor's star power. Fixed-payment-only contracts are most strongly influenced by measures of signalling and star power. Data on both types of contract provide strong support for the rent-capture theory: actors are paid rents upfront for the star value they add to the production. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Cultural Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 37-56
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:28:y:2004:i:1:p:37-56

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Related research
Keywords: motion pictures; risk-sharing; share contracts; signalling; star power;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Nancy L. Rose & Andrea Shepard, 1997. "Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 489-514, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns Of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Steven Albert, 1998. "Movie Stars and the Distribution of Financially Successful Films in the Motion Picture Industry," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 249-270, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Darlene C. Chisholm, 1993. "Asset Specificity and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of the Motion-Pictures Industry," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 143-155, Spring. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Arthur De Vany & W. Walls, 1999. "Uncertainty in the Movie Industry: Does Star Power Reduce the Terror of the Box Office?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 285-318, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alan Paul & Archie Kleingartner, 1994. "Flexible production and the transformation of industrial relations in the motion picture and television industry," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 47(4), pages 663-678, July.
  9. De Vany, Arthur & Walls, W David, 1996. "Bose-Einstein Dynamics and Adaptive Contracting in the Motion Picture Industry," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(439), pages 1493-1514, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1995. "Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 447-51, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francisco Alcalá & Miguel González-Maestre, 2009. "Copying, Superstars, and Artistic Creation," Working Papers 0902, International Economics Institute, University of Valencia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alcalá, Francisco & Gonzalez-Maestre, Miguel, 2009. "Artistic Creation and Intellectual Property," Annals of Computational Economics 4614, Murcia University, DIGITUM. Universidad de Murcia. [Downloadable!]
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