Knowledge based resources, property based resources and supplier bargaining power in Hollywood motion picture projects
AbstractSupplier bargaining power is a factor that must be considered in resource based theories of dynamic capability. As competitors develop capabilities for dynamically changing resource configurations, they become more reliant on suppliers and allies. Because different types of supplier will have more or less bargaining power, some resource configurations will be more attractive to buyers. Hypotheses are developed and tested using data on star power, intellectual property, knowledge based resource quality, costs and revenues for 278 motion pictures released in the United States in 2000 and 2001. Suppliers appear to fully appropriate returns to knowledge and property based services, while buyers benefit from control of intellectual property and from the combination of intellectual property and talent behind the camera.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Business Research.
Volume (Year): 62 (2009)
Issue (Month): 8 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres
Resource based view Bargaining power Motion pictures Dynamic competition;
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