On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations
AbstractWe examine the question whether a decision should be delegated to a subordinate and whether this is done efficiently. We illustrate in a dynamic principal-agent model that delegation is useful for several reasons. First, it serves to test agents with unknown ability. Then, it may improve an agent's motivation when carrying out decisions as successful outcomes improve his reputation and hence his future wages. Costs of delegation arise from the risk of having decisions of lower quality and because after having made a successful decision a subordinate's power is increased. The latter effect may lead to inefficient delegation decisions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 157 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Other versions of this item:
- Sliwka, Dirk, 1999. "On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations," Discussion Paper Serie A 600, University of Bonn, Germany.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
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- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2010.
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Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
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