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Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists

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  • Tom Coupé
  • Valérie Smeets
  • Frédéric Warzynski

Abstract

In this paper we study empirically the labor market of economists. We look at the mobility and promotion patterns of a sample of 1,000 top economists over thirty years and link it to their productivity and other personal characteristics. We find that the probability of promotion and of upward mobility is positively related to past production. However, the sensitivity of promotion and mobility to production diminishes with experience, indicating the presence of a learning process. We also find evidence that economists respond to incentives. They tend to exert more effort at the beginning of their career when dynamic incentives are important. This finding is robust to the introduction of tenure, which has an additional negative ex post impact on production. Our results indicate therefore that both promotions and tenure have an effect on the provision of incentives. Finally, we detect evidence of a sorting process, as the more productive individuals are allocated to the higher ranked universities. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.

Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 137-167

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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:22:y:2006:i:1:p:137-167

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Cited by:
  1. Raquel Carrasco & Javier Ruiz-Castillo, 2014. "The Evolution Of The Scientific Productivity Of Highly Productive Economists," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 1-16, 01.
  2. Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2003. "Karriereanreize für Wissenschaftler an Hochschulen im deutsch-amerikanischen Vergleich," Working Papers 0051, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jan 2004.
  3. Frank Mueller-Langer & Patrick Andreoli-Versbach, 2014. "Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure," Working Paper Series of the German Council for Social and Economic Data 239, German Council for Social and Economic Data (RatSWD).
  4. Michael Rauber & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2008. "Life Cycle and Cohort Productivity in Economic Research: The Case of Germany," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9, pages 431-456, November.
  5. Ana Maria Takahashi & Shingo Takahashi, 2010. "The effect of refereed articles on salary, promotion and labor mobility: The case of Japanese economists," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 330-350.
  6. Michael Rauber & Heinrich Ursprung, 2006. "Evaluation of researchers : a life cycle analysis of German academic economists," Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor 06-08, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim.
  7. Günther G. Schulze & Susanne Warning & Christian Wiermann, 2008. "What and How Long Does It Take to Get Tenure? The Case of Economics and Business Administration in Austria, Germany and Switzerland," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9, pages 473-505, November.
  8. Pezzoni, Michele & Sterzi, Valerio & Lissoni, Francesco, 2012. "Career progress in centralized academic systems: Social capital and institutions in France and Italy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 704-719.
  9. Smeets, Valerie, 2004. "Are There Fast Tracks in Economic Departments? Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists," Working Papers 04-4, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
  10. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91 - 147.
  11. Vinod Mishra & Russell Smyth, 2012. "Are More Senior Academics Really More Research Productive than Junior Academics? Evidence from Australian Law Schools," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 47-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.

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