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Managerial Entrenchment, Banker Distribution, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Japan

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Author Info
Takanori Tanaka () (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)
Abstract

This paper investigates whether managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders affects the distribution of bankers to the boards of Japanese manufacturing firms. Bankers are not likely to be appointed to firms with large corporate shareholders as controlling shareholders because large corporate shareholders have incentives to entrench managers. Moreover, in the aftermath of executive appointments of banks and large corporate shareholders, restructuring and improved performances of the appointing firms are facilitated. The results suggest that managerial entrenchment of large corporate shareholders generates the substitution of role of corporate governance between banks and large corporate shareholders.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 09-02.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0902

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Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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Related research
Keywords: Corporate governance; Managerial entrenchment; Controlling shareholders; Banks;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

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