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Dominant institutional owners and firm value

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  • Ruiz-Mallorquí, María Victoria
  • Santana-Martín, Domingo J.
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    Abstract

    This research analyzes the impact of control by dominant institutional owners (banking institutions and investment funds) on firm value. The analysis considers the level of voting rights in the hands of the dominant institutional owner and other large shareholders. The results reveal a different effect on value depending on whether the dominant institutional investor is a banking institution or an investment fund. Moreover, the results show that the presence of other large shareholders affects firm value when a dominant institutional owner controls the firm.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.

    Volume (Year): 35 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 118-129

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:1:p:118-129

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf

    Related research

    Keywords: Institutional investors Value Voting rights Banks Investment funds Coalitions Contestability;

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    Cited by:
    1. Azofra, Valentín & Santamaría, Marcos, 2011. "Ownership, control, and pyramids in Spanish commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1464-1476, June.
    2. Fernando, Chitru S. & Gatchev, Vladimir A. & Spindt, Paul A., 2012. "Institutional ownership, analyst following, and share prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2175-2189.
    3. Bajo, Emanuele & Barbi, Massimiliano & Bigelli, Marco & Hillier, David, 2013. "The role of institutional investors in public-to-private transactions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4327-4336.
    4. Croci, Ettore & Gonenc, Halit & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2012. "CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in Continental Europe," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3318-3335.
    5. Borisova, Ginka & Brockman, Paul & Salas, Jesus M. & Zagorchev, Andrey, 2012. "Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 2917-2934.
    6. Lim, Youngdeok, 2011. "Tax avoidance, cost of debt and shareholder activism: Evidence from Korea," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 456-470, February.

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