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Stakeholder capitalism, corporate governance and firm value

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  • Allen, Franklin
  • Carletti, Elena
  • Marquez, Robert

Abstract

We consider the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers as well as shareholders compared to shareholderoriented firms. Societies with stakeholder-oriented firms have higher prices, lower output, and can have greater firm value than shareholder-oriented societies. In some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value. Consumers that prefer to buy from stakeholder firms can also enforce a stakeholder society. With globalization entry by stakeholder firms is relatively more attractive than entry by shareholder firms for all societies. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies (CFS) in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number 2007/26.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200726

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Keywords: Firm Objective; Bankruptcy; Competition; Stakeholder Governance;

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References

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  16. Martijn Cremers & Vinay Nair & Urs Peyer, 2007. "Takeover Defenses and Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management amz2491, Yale School of Management, revised 18 Sep 2007.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Leenheer, Jorna & de Nooij, Michiel & Sheikh, Omer, 2011. "Own power: Motives of having electricity without the energy company," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 5621-5629, September.
  2. Nicolas Piluso & Gabriel Colletis, 2012. "Shareholder value and equilibrium rate of unemployment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3233-3242.
  3. Jiao, Yawen, 2010. "Stakeholder welfare and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2549-2561, October.
  4. Semenova, Natalia & Hassel, Lars & Nilsson, Henrik, 2009. "The Value Relevance of Environmental and Social Performance: Evidence from Swedish SIX 300 Companies," Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers, Sustainable Investment Research Platform 2009/4, Sustainable Investment Research Platform.
  5. repec:dis:wpaper:dis1304 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Ogebe, Patrick & Ogebe, Joseph & Alewi, Kemi, 2013. "The Impact of Capital Structure on Firms’ Performance in Nigeria," MPRA Paper 46173, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Linus Wilson, 2011. "Hard debt, soft CEOs, and union rents," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(8), pages 736-764, August.
  8. Edith Ginglinger & William Megginson & Timothee Waxin, 2011. "Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00626310, HAL.
  9. Ge, Wenxia & Kim, Jeong-Bon & Song, Byron Y., 2012. "Internal governance, legal institutions and bank loan contracting around the world," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 413-432.
  10. Alberto Chilosi, 2011. "Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the varieties of capitalism, and long term unemployment," Discussion Papers 2011/126, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  11. Managi, Shunsuke & Okimoto, Tatsuyoshi & Matsuda, Akimi, 2012. "Do Socially Responsible Investment Indexes Outperform Conventional Indexes?," MPRA Paper 36662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Renneboog, Luc & Ter Horst, Jenke & Zhang, Chendi, 2008. "Socially responsible investments: Institutional aspects, performance, and investor behavior," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(9), pages 1723-1742, September.
  13. Jürgen Odenius, 2008. "Germany's Corporate Governance Reforms," IMF Working Papers 08/179, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Ojah Patrick, Ogebe & Joseph Orinya, Ogebe & Kemi, Alewi, 2013. "The Impact of Capital Structure on Firms’ Performance in Nigeria," MPRA Paper 45986, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Apr 2013.
  15. Brisley, Neil & Bris, Arturo & Cabolis, Christos, 2011. "A theory of optimal expropriation, mergers and industry competition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 955-965, April.
  16. Loretta J. Mester, 2010. "Comment on "A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe"," NBER Chapters, in: Europe and the Euro, pages 246-253 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Luis H.B. Braido & V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, 2012. "Output contingent securities and efficient investment by firms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000371, David K. Levine.
  18. Renneboog, Luc & Ter Horst, Jenke & Zhang, Chendi, 2008. "The price of ethics and stakeholder governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 302-322, June.
  19. Kenichi Ueda & Stijn Claessens, 2008. "Banks and Labor As Stakeholders," IMF Working Papers 08/229, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Martijn Cremers & Vinay Nair & Urs Peyer, 2007. "Takeover Defenses and Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management amz2491, Yale School of Management, revised 18 Sep 2007.

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