IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eui/euiwps/eco2009-10.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value

Author

Listed:
  • Franklin Allen
  • Elena Carletti
  • Robert Marquez

Abstract

In countries such as Germany, the legal system is such that firms are necessarily stakeholder oriented. In others like Japan social convention achieves a similar effect. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to pure shareholder-oriented firms. We show that in a context of imperfect competition stakeholder firms have higher prices and lower output than shareholder-oriented firms. Surprisingly, we also find that firms can be more valuable in a stakeholder society than in a shareholder society. With globalization stakeholder firms and shareholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms, and compare these asymmetric equilibria with symmetric equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms. Finally, we show that, in some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value.

Suggested Citation

  • Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2009. "Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/10, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2009/10
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/10678/1/ECO_2009_10.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Titman, Sheridan, 1998. "Pricing Strategy and Financial Policy," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(4), pages 705-737.
    2. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Brander, James A. & Lewis, Tracy R., 1986. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 956-970, December.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Mitchel Y. Abolafia (ed.), 2005. "Markets," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2788, April.
    6. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance,in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109 Elsevier.
    7. Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
    8. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm," Chapters,in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 18, pages 315-341 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1999-2043, December.
    10. Blinder Alan S., 1993. "A Simple Note on the Japanese Firm," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 238-255, September.
    11. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1005-1030.
    12. Zvi Griliches, 1996. "The Discovery of the Residual: A Historical Note," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 1324-1330.
    13. Denis, Diane K. & McConnell, John J., 2003. "International Corporate Governance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 1-36, March.
    14. Dore, Ronald, 2000. "Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199240616.
    15. Martijn Cremers & Vinay Nair & Urs Peyer, 2007. "Takeover Defenses and Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2491, Yale School of Management, revised 18 Sep 2007.
    16. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    17. Kenneth Scott, 1998. "The Role Of Corporate Governance In South Korean Economic Reform," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 10(4), pages 8-15.
    18. Fauver, Larry & Fuerst, Michael E., 2006. "Does good corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 673-710, December.
    19. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    20. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
    21. Kenichi Ueda & Stijn Claessens, 2008. "Banks and Labor as Stakeholders; Impact on Economic Performance," IMF Working Papers 08/229, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shunsuke Managi & Tatsuyoshi Okimoto & Akimi Matsuda, 2012. "Do socially responsible investment indexes outperform conventional indexes?," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 1511-1527.
    2. Renneboog, Luc & Ter Horst, Jenke & Zhang, Chendi, 2008. "The price of ethics and stakeholder governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 302-322, June.
    3. Chan, Chia-Ying & Chou, De-Wai & Lo, Huai-Chun, 2017. "Do financial constraints matter when firms engage in CSR?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 241-259.
    4. Viral V. Acharya & Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2011. "The Internal Governance of Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(3), pages 689-720, June.
    5. Ginglinger, Edith & Megginson, William & Waxin, Timothée, 2011. "Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 868-887, September.
    6. Ogebe, Patrick & Ogebe, Joseph & Alewi, Kemi, 2013. "The Impact of Capital Structure on Firms’ Performance in Nigeria," MPRA Paper 46173, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Brisley, Neil & Bris, Arturo & Cabolis, Christos, 2011. "A theory of optimal expropriation, mergers and industry competition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 955-965, April.
    8. Nicolas Piluso & Gabriel Colletis, 2012. "Shareholder value and equilibrium rate of unemployment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3233-3242.
    9. Giovanni Ferri & Angelo Leogrande, 2015. "Was the Crisis Due to a Shift from Stakeholder to Shareholder Finance? Surveying the Debate," Euricse Working Papers 1576, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
    10. Ojah Patrick, Ogebe & Joseph Orinya, Ogebe & Kemi, Alewi, 2013. "The Impact of Capital Structure on Firms’ Performance in Nigeria," MPRA Paper 45986, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Apr 2013.
    11. Marco Zanobio, 2013. "I modelli di capitalismo," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis1304, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    12. Mohamed A. Ayadi & Hatem Ben-Ameur & Lawrence Kryzanowski, 2016. "Typical and Tail Performance of Canadian Equity SRI Mutual Funds," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 50(1), pages 57-94, August.
    13. Alberto Chilosi, 2011. "Stakeholder protection in corporate governance and in the legal system, the varieties of capitalism, and long term unemployment," Discussion Papers 2011/126, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    14. Ge, Wenxia & Kim, Jeong-Bon & Song, Byron Y., 2012. "Internal governance, legal institutions and bank loan contracting around the world," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 413-432.
    15. Jürgen Odenius, 2008. "Germany’s Corporate Governance Reforms; Has the System Become Flexible Enough?," IMF Working Papers 08/179, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Luis H.B. Braido & V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, 2012. "Output contingent securities and efficient investment by firms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000371, David K. Levine.
    17. Renneboog, Luc & Ter Horst, Jenke & Zhang, Chendi, 2008. "Socially responsible investments: Institutional aspects, performance, and investor behavior," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(9), pages 1723-1742, September.
    18. Semenova, Natalia & Hassel, Lars & Nilsson, Henrik, 2009. "The Value Relevance of Environmental and Social Performance: Evidence from Swedish SIX 300 Companies," Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers 2009/4, Sustainable Investment Research Platform.
    19. Jiao, Yawen, 2010. "Stakeholder welfare and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2549-2561, October.
    20. Leenheer, Jorna & de Nooij, Michiel & Sheikh, Omer, 2011. "Own power: Motives of having electricity without the energy company," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 5621-5629, September.
    21. Kenichi Ueda & Stijn Claessens, 2008. "Banks and Labor as Stakeholders; Impact on Economic Performance," IMF Working Papers 08/229, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Linus Wilson, 2011. "Hard debt, soft CEOs, and union rents," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(8), pages 736-764, July.
    23. Giovanni Ferri & Angelo Leogrande, 2015. "Was the Crisis Due to a Shift from Stakeholder to Shareholder Finance? Surveying the Debate," Euricse Working Papers 1576, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
    24. Loretta J. Mester, 2010. "Comment on "A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe"," NBER Chapters,in: Europe and the Euro, pages 246-253 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Martijn Cremers & Vinay Nair & Urs Peyer, 2007. "Takeover Defenses and Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2491, Yale School of Management, revised 18 Sep 2007.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    stakeholder-oriented firms; shareholder-oriented firms; firm value; globalization;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2009/10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julia Valerio). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deiueit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.