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Stakeholder capitalism, corporate governance and firm value

  • Allen, Franklin
  • Carletti, Elena
  • Marquez, Robert

We consider the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers as well as shareholders compared to shareholderoriented firms. Societies with stakeholder-oriented firms have higher prices, lower output, and can have greater firm value than shareholder-oriented societies. In some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this increases their value. Consumers that prefer to buy from stakeholder firms can also enforce a stakeholder society. With globalization entry by stakeholder firms is relatively more attractive than entry by shareholder firms for all societies.

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File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/25527/1/559751974.PDF
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Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies (CFS) in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number 2007/26.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200726
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