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Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance

Author

Listed:
  • Chilosi, Alberto
  • Damiani, Mirella

Abstract

The paper is divided in two coordinate parts. The first considers in general the issue of stockholders vs. stakeholders oriented governance systems and their relative merits and demerits. The second part deals specifically with the issue of the principal-agent problem in a stakeholder context.

Suggested Citation

  • Chilosi, Alberto & Damiani, Mirella, 2007. "Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance," MPRA Paper 2334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2334
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2334/1/MPRA_paper_2334.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ninghua Zhong & Shujing Wang & Rudai Yang, 2017. "Does Corporate Governance Enhance Common Interests of Shareholders and Primary Stakeholders?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 141(2), pages 411-431, March.
    2. Mirella Daminai & Fabrizio Pompei, 2008. "Mergers, acquisitions and technological regimes: the European experience over the period 2002-2005," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica 46/2008, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia.
    3. N. Craig Smith & David Rönnegard, 2016. "Shareholder Primacy, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Role of Business Schools," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 463-478, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stakeholders; Corporate Governance; Varieties of Capitalism;

    JEL classification:

    • P1 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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