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Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance

  • Chilosi, Alberto
  • Damiani, Mirella

The paper is divided in two coordinate parts. The first considers in general the issue of stockholders vs. stakeholders oriented governance systems and their relative merits and demerits. The second part deals specifically with the issue of the principal-agent problem in a stakeholder context.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2334/1/MPRA_paper_2334.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2334.

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Date of creation: 20 Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2334
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  28. Chemla, Gilles, 2005. "Hold-Up, Stakeholders and Takeover Threats," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4134, Paris Dauphine University.
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  46. Chemla, Gilles, 2005. "Hold-up, stakeholders and takeover threats," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 376-397, July.
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