Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions
This article examines institutional linkages between corporate governance and labour management in Germany. German corporate governance was characterised by the importance of banks, ownership concentration, long-term investment, and stable corporate networks. This system displayed important complementarities with stable long-term employment, investment in worker training, flexible quality production, low variability and dispersion in pay, and cooperative industrial relations during the post-war period. Since the mid-1990s, corporate governance has changed dramatically - a decline in the role of banks, the unwinding of corporate networks, the rise of foreign and institutional investors, en emerging market for corporate control, and changing careers and compensation of top managers. The paper investigates the resulting introduction of shareholder-value management practices and their impact on employees in large German companies. The findings show that these changes are related to the shrinking of stable core employment and the growth of variable pay. However, such tensions with shareholder value management have not undermined employee codetermination and collective bargaining institutions. Both play an important mediating role between capital market pressures and employment outcomes. The implications for the German "model" of corporate governance are discussed.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2004|
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