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Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance

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Author Info
Chilosi, Alberto
Damiani, Mirella

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Abstract

The paper is divided in two coordinate parts. The first considers in general the issue of stockholders vs. stakeholders oriented governance systems and their relative merits and demerits. The second part deals specifically with the issue of the principal-agent problem in a stakeholder context.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2334.

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Date of creation: 20 Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2334

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Related research
Keywords: Stakeholders Corporate Governance Varieties of Capitalism

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
P1 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems
L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Damiani, Mirella & Pompei, Fabrizio, 2008. "Mergers, acquisitions and technological regimes: the European experience over the period 2002- 2005," MPRA Paper 8226, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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