A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ
AbstractA wave of financial irregularity in the USA in 2001--2 culminated in the Sarbanes--Oxley Act. A worldwide stockmarket bubble burst over this same period, with the actual market decline being proportionately more severe in Europe. Yet, no corresponding wave of financial scandals involving a similar level of companies occurred in Europe. Given the higher level of public and private enforcement in the USA for securities fraud, this contrast seems perplexing. This paper submits that different kinds of scandals characterize different systems of corporate governance. In particular, dispersed ownership systems of governance are prone to the forms of earnings management that erupted in the USA, but concentrated ownership systems are much less vulnerable. Instead, the characteristic scandal in such systems is the appropriation of private benefits of control. This paper suggests that this difference in the likely source of, and motive for, financial misconduct has implications both for the utility of gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries and for design of legal controls to protect public shareholders. The difficulty in achieving auditor independence in a corporation with a controlling shareholder may also imply that minority shareholders in concentrated ownership economies should directly select their own gatekeepers. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 21 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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