This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Capital Structure Choice when Managers are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Walter Novaes
Luigi Zingales
Abstract

Recent capital structure theories have emphasized the role of debt in minimizing the agency costs that arise from the separation between ownership and control. In this paper we argue that capital structure choices themselves are affected by the same agency problem. We show that, in general, the shareholders' and the manager's capital structure choices differ not only in their levels, but also in their sensitivities to the cost of financial distress and taxes. We argue that only the managerial perspective can explain why firms are generally reluctant to issue equity, why they issue it only following a stock price run-up, and why Corporate America recently deleveraged under the same tax system that supposedly generated the increase in leverage in the 1980s.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5384.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5384.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5384

Note: CF
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1995. " What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1421-60, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, 1988. "Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?," NBER Working Papers 2632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Myers, Stewart C, 1984. " The Capital Structure Puzzle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 575-92, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Israel, Ronen, 1991. " Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: The Defensive Role of Debt Financing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1391-1409, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1989. "The design of securities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 255-287. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stewart C. Myers, 1984. "Capital Structure Puzzle," NBER Working Papers 1393, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Myers, Stewart C., 1984. "Capital structure puzzle," Working papers 1548-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  9. Stulz, ReneM., 1990. "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-27, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1995. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 567-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate control contests and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luis H. Gutiérrez & Carlos Pombo, 2005. "Corporate Valuation and Governance: Evidence from Colombia," RES Working Papers 3216, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Joseph P. Hughes & William W. Lang & Choon-Geol Moon & Michael S. Pagano, 2004. "Managerial Incentives and the Efficiency of Capital Structure in U.S. Commercial Banking," Departmental Working Papers 200401, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Joseph P. Hughes & William W. Lang & Choo-Geol Moon & Michael S. Pagano, 2001. "Managerial incentives and the efficiency of capital structure," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 385-422.
  4. Luis H. Gutiérrez & Carlos Pombo, 2005. "Valuación y gobierno corporativo: elementos de juicio de Colombia," RES Working Papers 3217, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Joseph P. Hughes & Choon-Geol Moon & William W. Lang & Michael S. Pagano, 2001. "Managerial Incentives and the Efficiency of Capital Structure," Departmental Working Papers 200102, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, 2005. "Debt and corporate governance in emerging economies: Evidence from India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2005-007, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India. [Downloadable!]
  7. Nigel Driffield & Vidya Mahambare & Sarmistha Pal, 2004. "Dynamic Adjustment of Corporate Leverage: Is there a lesson to learn from the Recent Asian Crisis?," Finance 0405007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Joseph P. Hughes & Choon-Geol Moon, 2004. "Estimating managers' utility-maximizing demand for agency goods," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 320-352. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 1000 institutions contribute their bibliographic data directly to this service.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.