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Regulating bank capital structure to control risk

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  • Edward Simpson Prescott

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  • Edward Simpson Prescott, 2001. "Regulating bank capital structure to control risk," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 35-52.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2001:i:sum:p:35-52
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Berger, Allen N, 1995. "The Relationship between Capital and Earnings in Banking," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(2), pages 432-456, May.
    2. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 2(Oct), pages 1-14.
    3. Green, Richard C., 1984. "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 115-136, March.
    4. Black, Fischer & Miller, Merton H & Posner, Richard A, 1978. "An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 379-412, July.
    5. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    6. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
    7. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    8. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    9. Gianni De Nicolo, 2000. "Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective," International Finance Discussion Papers 689, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2012. "Contingent capital: the trigger problem," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 98(1Q), pages 33-50.
    2. John A. Weinberg, 2002. "Competition among bank regulators," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 19-36.
    3. Abina, Adedigba Praise & Akinola Isilamiyat Esther, 2020. "Capital Structure and Firms’ Performance. A Review of Quoted Nigeria Banks," Journal of Contemporary Research in Social Sciences, Michael Laurence, vol. 2(4), pages 81-88.
    4. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2013. "Too Big to Manage? Two Book Reviews," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 2Q, pages 143-162.
    5. Huberto M. Ennis & H. S. Malek, 2005. "Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 91(Spr), pages 21-44.
    6. Cristina Pereira Pedro & Joaquim J. S. Ramalho & Jacinto Vidigal Silva, 2018. "The main determinants of banking crises in OECD countries," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 154(1), pages 203-227, February.
    7. repec:fip:fedreq:y:2012:i:1q:p:33-50:n:vol.98no.1 is not listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Risk; Bank capital;

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