Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C79: Other

2006

• Kang-oh Yi, 2006, "On the Convergence of Logit Equilibrium in Order Statistic Games," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 22, pages 69-82.
• GORDON, Sidartha, 2006, "Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 2006-06.
• GORDON, Sidartha, 2006, "Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 17-2006.
• Erwin Jericha & Martin Schürz, 2006, "A Deliberative Independent Central Bank," Working Papers, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), number 133, Nov.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006, "Active Courts and Menu Contracts," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 06-025, Oct.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2006, "Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 21434, Jun, revised 03 Sep 2009.
• William Thomson, 2006, "On the Existence of Consistent Rules to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims: A Constructive Geometric Approach," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 528, Apr.
• William Thomson, 2006, "The Two-Agent Claims-Truncated Proportional Rule Has No Consistent Extension: A Constructive Proof," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 529, Apr.
• William Thomson, 2006, "A Characterization of a Family of Rules for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 530, Apr.
• William Thomson & Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2006, "Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 531, Jun.
• Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2006, "A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 28, issue 2, pages 283-307, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0636-3.
• Wolfgang Leininger, 2006, "Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 29, issue 3, pages 713-719, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0027-9.
• ,, 2006, "Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 1, issue 2, pages 207-231, June.
• Englmaier, Florian & Reisinger, Markus, 2006, "Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, number 87, Feb.
• Harmsen - van Hout, M.J.W. & Herings, P.J.J. & Dellaert, B.G.C., 2006, "The structure of online consumer communication networks," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR), number 028, Jan, DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2006028.
• Emilia Tomczyk, 2006, "Rationality of expectations: comparison of neoclassical and evolutionary approaches," Working Papers, Department of Applied Econometrics, Warsaw School of Economics, number 8, May.

2005

• Raymond Fisman & Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits, 2005, "Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, number 0061, Nov.
• João Ricardo Faria, 2005, "The Game Academics Play: Editors versus Authors," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, volume 57, issue 1, pages 1-12, January, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2005.00212.x.
• Giacomo Bonanno, 2005, "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics, number 311, Feb.
• Fisman, Raymond J & Kariv, Shachar & Markovits, Daniel, 2005, "Individual Preferences for Giving," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley, number qt3h7672sq, Feb.
• Fisman, Raymond & Kariv, Shachar & Markovitz, Daniel, 2005, "Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley, number qt9q26c4fr, Nov.
• Murali Agastya, 2005, "On Choosing Which Game to Play When Ignorant of the Rules," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 784828000000000557, Nov.
• Ran Spiegler, 2005, "Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 122247000000000535, Nov.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005, "Ex Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 784828000000000018, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005, "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 784828000000000116, Jun.
• Raymond Fisman & Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits, 2005, "Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 784828000000000284, Sep.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005, "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org, number 666156000000000593, Mar.
• Carlos Ignacio Patino & Julio César Alonso, 2005, "Evaluación de pronósticos para la tasa de cambio en Colombia," Estudios Gerenciales, Universidad Icesi.
• Kandori, Michihiro & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2005, "Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number we056433, Nov.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005, "Ex Post Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1502, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Thomas Eisenbach & Joan Feigenbaum & Scott Shenker, 2005, "Flexibility as an Instrument in Digital Rights Management," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1505, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005, "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1519, Jun.
• Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005, "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1527R, Jul, revised Apr 2007.
• Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005, "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1527R2, Jul, revised Sep 2008.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2005, "Information in Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1532, Aug.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2005, "Information in Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1532R, Aug, revised Jan 2006.
• Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2005, "Learning to like what you have - explaining the endowment effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 115, issue 505, pages 689-702, July.
• Sergiu Hart, 2005, "Adaptive Heuristics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 73, issue 5, pages 1401-1430, September.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005, "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 73, issue 6, pages 1771-1813, November.
• Dawid, Herbert & Deissenberg, Christophe, 2005, "On the efficiency-effects of private (dis-)trust in the government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 57, issue 4, pages 530-550, August.
• Spiegler, Ran, 2005, "Testing threats in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 121, issue 2, pages 214-235, April.
• Abele, S.C. & Stasser, G., 2005, "Continuous versus Step-Level Public Good Games," ERIM Report Series Research in Management, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam, number ERS-2005-015-ORG, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005, "Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number ECO2005/10.
• Martin Gregor, 2005, "Tolerable Intolerance: An Evolutionary Model," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, number 72, revised 2005.
• Rob Dellink & Michael Finus & Niels Olieman, 2005, "Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2005.98, Jul.
• Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2005, "Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 1583, May.
• Holler Manfred J. & Nurmi Hannu, 2005, "Power, Outcomes and Preferences / Macht, Ereignisse und Präferenzen," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, volume 225, issue 2, pages 181-191, April, DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2005-0205.
• Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2005, "Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics, number 0503, Mar.
• Boris Salazar & Andrés Cendales, 2005, "Teoría de la utilidad neoclásica: un juego semántico de interacción estratégica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, volume 7, issue 12, pages 97-112, January-J.
• Herbert Dawid & Christophe Deissenberg & Pavel Ševčik, 2005, "Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game," Springer Books, Springer, chapter 0, in: Alain Haurie & Georges Zaccour, "Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications", DOI: 10.1007/0-387-24602-9_9.
• Quant, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Maaten, R., 2005, "A Concede-and-Divide Rule for Bankruptcy Problems," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2005-20.
• Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2005, "Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2005-84.
• van den Brink, J.R. & Gilles, R.P., 2005, "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2005-75.
• Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2005, "Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 39cf595b-19d9-4b4a-8fc8-d.
• Teck-Hua Ho & Keith Weigelt, 2005, "Trust among Strangers," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0504006, Apr.
• Raymond Fisman & Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits, 2005, "Individual Preferences for Giving," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0504007, Apr.
• Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Gilles, Robert Paul, 2005, "Network Potentials," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), number 28/2005.

2004

• Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004, "Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, number 0042, Jul.
• Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004, "Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 2004-06.
• Giacomo Bonanno, 2004, "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics, number 164, Dec.
• Sergiu Hart, 2004, "Adaptive Heuristics," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 122247000000000471, Sep.
• Ana Paula Martins & Rui Coimbra, 2004, "Efficient Union Contracts in the Presence of Homogeneous Labor and Differentiated Unions," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 5, issue 1, pages 27-46, May.
• Olivier Donni, 2004, "La théorie des modèles non coopératifs d'offre de travail et ses applications empiriques," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 2004-03.
• Rene van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2004, "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society, number 393, Aug.
• Hehenkamp, B. & Leininger, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2004, "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 20, issue 4, pages 1045-1057, November.
• John A. Papanastasiou & Ioannis T. Lazaridis & Theofanis Karagiorgos, 2004, "Burden Sharing in NATO," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, volume 0, issue 1-2, pages 77-92.
• Christophe Deissenberg & Herbert Dawid & Pavel Sevcik, 2004, "Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2004.137, Nov.
• Olivier Donni, 2004, "La théorie des modèles non coopératifs d'offre de travail et ses applications empiriques," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE, number 0409.
• Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2004, "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics, number 0229r, May.
• Sébastien Vivier-Lirimont, 2004, "Interbanking networks: towards a small financial world?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number v04046, May.
• Somdeb Lahiri, 2004, "The class of opportunity filters and the preference revealed by a path independent choice function," Nova Economia, Economics Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brazil), volume 14, issue 1, pages 111-120, January-A.
• Daniel John Zizzo, 2004, "Positive Harmony Transformations and Equilibrium Selection in Two-Player Games," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 197, Jul.
• Boris Salazar, 2004, "Nash y von Neumann: mundos posibles y juegos de lenguaje," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, volume 6, issue 10, pages 71-94, January-J.
• Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2004, "A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 511, Nov.
• Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2004, "Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-286, Jun.
• Han, Seungjin, 2004, "Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics, number han-04-01-29-10-05-13, Jan, revised 29 Jan 2004.
• Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004, "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management, number ysm380, Jul.

2003

• Giovanni Dosi & Sidney G. Winter, 2003, "Interprétation évolutionniste du changement économique. Une étude comparative," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 54, issue 2, pages 385-406.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003, "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 447, Feb.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003, "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics, number 666156000000000035, Jun.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003, "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1421, May.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003, "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1421R, May, revised Apr 2004.
• Broadberry, Stephen & Sayantan Ghosal, 2003, "Technology, Organisation and Productivity Performance in Services: Lessons from Britain and the United States, 1870-1990," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Royal Economic Society, number 30, Jun.
• Filippin, Antonio, 2003, "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Royal Economic Society, number 78, Jun.
• Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2003, "Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 3576, Feb.
• Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2003, "Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 3593, Nov.
• John A. Papanastasiou & Ioannis T. Lazaridis & Theofanis Karagiorgos, 2003, "Burden Sharing In Nato," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, volume 0, issue 3-4, pages 207-220, July - De.
• Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003, "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~03-03-26, Mar.
• Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003, "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~03-03-29, Jan.
• Filippin, Antonio, 2003, "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 823, Jul.
• Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2003, "Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation," Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics, number 03_01, Apr.
• Antonio Filippin, 2003, "Discrimination and workers' expectations," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano, number 2003-015, Jan.
• Antonio Filippin, 2003, "Discrimination and workers' expectations," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano, number 2003-15, Jan.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003, "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 03-026, Nov.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003, "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 06-024, Nov, revised 01 Oct 2006.
• Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003, "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 22, issue 2, pages 431-446, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z.
• B. Hehenkamp & W. Leininger & A. Possajennikov, 2003, "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," Springer Books, Springer, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad, "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_34.
• René van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2003, "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 03-102/1, Dec.
• M. J. Gagen, 2003, "Multigame models of innovation in evolutionary economics," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0310001, Oct.
• Huck, Steffen & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Oechssler, Jörg, 2003, "Learning to Like What You Have: Explaining the Endowment Effect," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), number 5/2003.

2002

• Hiroshi Oaku, 2002, "Evolution with Delay," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, volume 53, issue 1, pages 114-133, March, DOI: 10.1111/1468-5876.00216.
• Antonio J. Morales Siles, 2002, "Absolute Expediency and Imitative Behaviour," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Centro de Estudios Andaluces, number E2002/03, Jan.
• Ran Spiegler, 2002, "Testing Threats in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 391749000000000445, Jan.
• Ran Spiegler, 2002, "Testing Threats in Repeated Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org, number 391749000000000445, Jan.
• DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni & SARTZETAKIS, Eftichios, 2002, "International environmental agreements - The role of foresight," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2002061, Oct.
• Deissenberg, Christophe & Gonzalez, Francisco Alvarez, 2002, "Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 9-10, pages 1457-1479, August.
• Piotrowski, E.W & Sładkowski, J, 2002, "Quantum market games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, volume 312, issue 1, pages 208-216, DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)00842-7.
• M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 2002, "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, number 482, Oct.
• Holler Manfred J., 2002, "Classical, Modern, and New Game Theory / Klassische, Moderne und Neue Spieltheorie," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, volume 222, issue 5, pages 556-583, October, DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2002-0504.
• Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002, "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics, number 0229, Jul.
• Mariko Yasugi & Sobei H. Oda, 2002, "A note on the wise girls puzzle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 19, issue 1, pages 145-156.
• Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2002, "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 02-069/1, Jul.
• Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H.W., 2002, "The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-4.

2001

• Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001, "Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 5.
• Jhon James Mora, 2001, "El papel de los costes de transacción en la formación de convenciones," Estudios Gerenciales, Universidad Icesi.
• Dieter Balkenborg & Karl H. Schlag, 2001, "On the Evolutionary Selection of Nash Equilibrium Components," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 0106, Sep.
• Spiegler, R., 2001, "Testing Threats in Repeated Games," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 2001-28.
• Mingli Zheng, 2001, "Liability Rules and Evolutionary Dynamics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 157, issue 4, pages 520-535, December.
• Michael Bacharach & Gerardo A. Guerra & Daniel John Zizzo, 2001, "Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 76, Oct.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001, "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 06-001, Mar, revised 01 Jan 2006.
• Beard, Rodney, 2001, "A note on Rubinstein's ``Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?"," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 5377, revised Oct 2007.
• Beard, Rodney, 2001, "A note on Rubinstein's ``Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?"," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 5795, revised 16 Nov 2007.
• Christophe Deissenberg and Francisco Alvarez Gonzalez, 2001, "Pareto-Improving Cheating In An Economic Policy Game," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001, Society for Computational Economics, number 88, Apr.
• Emilio Calvo & J. Carlos Santos, 2001, "A value for mixed action-set games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 30, issue 1, pages 61-78.
• Noritsugu Nakanishi, 2001, "On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 30, issue 2, pages 291-307.
• Tijs, S.H. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2001, "Finite Coverings by Cones," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2001-60.
• Francisco Álvarez González & Christophe Deissenberg, 2001, "Cheating for the common good in a Macroeconomic policy game," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico, number 0104.
• Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2001, "Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics, number vie0205, Mar.
• E. W. Piotrowski & J. Sladkowski, 2001, "Quantum Market Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 0103003, Apr.

2000

• Ponti, Giovanni, 2000, "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 30, issue 1, pages 115-141, January.
• Khan, A. & Sun, Y., 2000, "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 2000.80.
• Justin Smith, 2000, "On Kolmogorov Complexity and the Costs of Carrying out Strategies," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 19, Jul.
• Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen, 2000, "The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 16, issue 2, pages 355-362.
• Josef Hofbauer & Karl H. Schlag, 2000, "Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 10, issue 5, pages 523-543.
• Joao Ricardo Faria, 2000, "The Game Academics Play: Editors Versus Authors," Working Paper Series, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 105, Jun.

1999

• Anderlini, Luca, 1999, "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 1, pages 1-37, April.
• Gale, Douglas & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1999, "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 84, issue 1, pages 1-40, January.
• Schlag, Karl H., 1999, "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 4, pages 493-522, May.
• Julio Dávila & A. Alkan & Ch. D. Aliprantis & N.C. Yannelis, 1999, "On the connection between correlated equilibria and sunspot equilibria," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-00667489.
• Bauke Visser, 1999, "Endogenous local interaction and multi-product firms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 9, issue 2, pages 243-263.
• Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag, 1999, "Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 387, Apr.

1998

• Schlag, Karl H., 1998, "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 78, issue 1, pages 130-156, January.
• Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H., 1998, "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 83, issue 2, pages 260-285, December.
• Nehring, Klaus, 1998, "Incentive-compatibility in large games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 35, issue 1, pages 57-67, January.
• Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S., 1998, "Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 349.
• Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998, "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 45, issue 3, pages 263-289, December, DOI: 10.1023/A:1005038921033.
• Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 1998, "Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 11, issue 1, pages 163-187.
• George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1998, "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, number imp-mon, Jul.
• V. Bhaskar & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998, "Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria:Theoretical Foundations and Applications," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809003, Sep.

1997

• Galor, Oded & Tsiddon, Daniel, 1997, "Technological Progress, Mobility, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 87, issue 3, pages 363-382, June.
• Kim C. Border & Uzi Segal, 1997, "Preferences over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 65, issue 1, pages 1-18, January.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997, "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 2, pages 159-175, February.
• Evans, Robert, 1997, "Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 2, pages 211-220, May.
• Davila, J., 1997, "On the Connection Between Correlated Equilibria and Sunspot Equilibria," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 159.
• Mukerji, S. & Song Shin, H., 1997, "Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 137.
• Geir B. Asheim, 1997, "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 64, issue 3, pages 427-443.
• B. Visser, 1997, "Endogenous Local Interaction and Multi-Product Firms," Working Papers, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, number ir97005, Feb.
• Huck, Steffen & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Oechssler, Jörg, 1997, "Learning to like what you have: Explaining the endowment effect," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,38.

1996

• Binmore, K. & Proulx, C. & Samuelson, L. & Swierzbinski, J., 1996, "Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9517r.
• Chamorro, J.M., 1996, "Spatial Dispersion in Cournot Competition," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 332.96.
• Baliga, S. & Evans, R., 1996, "Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 9601.
• Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1996, "Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-21.
• Anderlini, L & Sabourian, H, 1996, "The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules : A Global Stability Result," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco96/05.
• Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1996, "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0065, Mar.
• Gale, D. & Rosental, R.W., 1996, "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 65.
• Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996, "Interactive Implementation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1751.
• Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996, "Decentralization and Collusion," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1757.
• Gaspart, F., 1996, "Vulcans and Klingons (part one): Simulating an Evolutionary Game with Random Matching and Adjustable Expectations," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 169.
• Dexit, A. & Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1996, "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 11-96.
• Galor, O. & Tsiddon, D., 1996, "Technological Progress, Mobility and Economic Growth," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 13-96.
• Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996, "Admission and Common Knowledge," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1996_004.