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Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con: Reply

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014. "Reducing Overreaction To Central Banks' Disclosures: Theory And Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1087-1126, August.
  2. Charles Goodhart, 2009. "The Interest Rate Conditioning Assumption," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(2), pages 85-108, June.
  3. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2014. "Measuring agents’ reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 61-77, March.
  4. Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246.
  5. Michal Skořepa & Viktor Kotlán, 2006. "Inflation Targeting: To Forecast or To Simulate?," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2006(4), pages 300-314.
  6. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2008. "On the Sources and Value of Information: Public Announcements and Macroeconomic Performance," Economics Series Working Papers 411, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014. "Reducing Overreaction To Central Banks' Disclosures: Theory And Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1087-1126, August.
  8. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities," Working Papers 080908, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  9. Luca Colombo & Gianluca Femminis & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Information Acquisition and Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1438-1483.
  10. Ricardo Reis, 2011. "When Should Policymakers Make Announcements?," 2011 Meeting Papers 122, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Vadym Lepetyuk & Christian A. Stoltenberg, 2013. "Policy Announcements and Welfare," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 962-997, September.
  12. Marek Rozkrut, 2008. "It’s not only WHAT is said, it’s also WHO the speaker is. Evaluating the effectiveness of central bank communication," NBP Working Papers 47, Narodowy Bank Polski, Economic Research Department.
  13. M.H. Middeldorp, 2011. "FOMC Communication Policy and the Accuracy of Fed Funds Futures," Working Papers 11-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
  14. Svensson, Lars E O, 2009. "Transparency under Flexible Inflation Targeting: Experiences and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 7213, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Michael Ehrmann & Sylvester Eijffinger & Marcel Fratzscher, 2012. "The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 1018-1052, September.
  16. Hiroki Arato & Tomoya Nakamura, 2013. "Endogenous Alleviation of Overreaction Problem by Aggregate Information Announcement," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 319-336, September.
  17. Benjamin Born & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2014. "Central Bank Communication on Financial Stability," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(577), pages 701-734, June.
  18. Walsh, Carl E., 2013. "Announcements and the Role of Policy Guidance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 575-600.
  19. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Craig Hakkio, 2009. "Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts," NBER Working Papers 15424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2008. "Coordinating Expectations in Monetary Policy," Chapters,in: Central Banks as Economic Institutions, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  21. Timothy Shields & Baohua Xin, 2012. "Higher-order Beliefs in Simple Trading Models," Working Papers 12-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  22. Paul Hubert, 2015. "Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(4), pages 771-789, June.
  23. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
  24. Volker Hahn, 2009. "Why the Publication of Socially Harmful Information May Be Socially Desirable," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/122, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  25. Luis Brandão Brandao Marques & R. G Gelos & Natalia Melgar, 2013. "Country Transparency and the Global Transmission of Financial Shocks," IMF Working Papers 13/156, International Monetary Fund.
  26. M. Middeldorp, 2011. "Central Bank Transparency, the Accuracy of Professional Forecasts, and Interest Rate Volatility," Working Papers 11-12, Utrecht School of Economics.
  27. Tong, Hui, 2007. "Disclosure standards and market efficiency: Evidence from analysts' forecasts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 222-241, May.
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