IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejmac/v9y2009i1n29.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy

Author

Listed:
  • Lindner Axel

    () (Halle Institute for Economic Research)

Abstract

This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight on their private information in the transparent case than in the case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.

Suggested Citation

  • Lindner Axel, 2009. "Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-18, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:29
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejm.2009.9.1/bejm.2009.9.1.1801/bejm.2009.9.1.1801.xml?format=INT
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    2. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2006. "Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 448-452, March.
    3. Hans Gersbach, 2003. "On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 91-102, August.
    4. Petra M. Geraats, 2006. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 52(1), pages 111-152, March.
    5. repec:zbw:iwhdps:178 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Pierre Gosselin & Aileen Lotz & Charles Wyplosz, 2009. "Interest Rate Signals and Central Bank Transparency," NBER Chapters,in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2007, pages 9-51 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. repec:zbw:iwhdps:16-07 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rhee, Hyuk Jae & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2013. "Central bank transparency: Does it matter?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 183-197.
    2. Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, 2011. "Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Herbst 2011: Europäische Schuldenkrise belastet deutsche Konjunktur," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(20), pages 03-71, October.
    3. Hyuk Rhee & Nurlan Turdaliev, 2015. "Central bank policy instrument forecasts," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 10(2), pages 221-245, October.
    4. Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, 2010. "Gemeinschaftsdiagnose Frühjahr 2010: Erholung setzt sich fort – Risiken bleiben groß," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63(08), pages 03-78, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.