Interest Rate Signals and Central Bank Transparency
The present paper extends the literature on central bank transparency that relies on information heterogeneity among private agents in four directions. First, it adds the interest rate to the list of signals that the central bank can reveal. Second, it allows for more than one economic fundamental. Third, it extends the range of uncertainties that matter. So far the literature has focused on uncertainty about the economic fundamentals, assumed to be estimated with known precision; we also allow for uncertainty about precision. Fourth, it derives results that are general in the sense that they do not depend on any particular social welfare criterion. Each extension sheds new light on the role of central bank transparency.
|Date of creation:||24 Aug 2007|
|Date of revision:||Aug 2007|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in NBER European Macroeconomic Annual.|
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