How Much Information should Interest Rate-Setting Central Banks Reveal?
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- Gosselin, Pierre & Gosselin-Lotz, Aileen & Wyplosz, Charles, 2006. "How Much Information Should Interest Rate-Setting Central Banks Reveal?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5666, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsCentral Bank Transparency;
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBA-2006-04-29 (Central Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2006-04-29 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-MAC-2006-04-29 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2006-04-29 (Monetary Economics)
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