IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpma/0304007.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Inflation Targeting: to Forecast or to Simulate

Author

Listed:
  • Michal Skorepa

    (Czech National Bank)

  • Viktor Kotlan

    (Czech National Bank)

Abstract

Inflation targeting is a regime based to a great extent on communication and, more specifically, on using and communicating assessments of future inflation. The central banking literature, however, devotes surprisingly little attention to some important issues connected with such assessments. There are some non-trivial choices that need to be made regarding future inflation assessments on three distinct levels: construction, decision making and communication. One of the most important choices relates to the treatment of the central bank’s behaviour within the assessment. We first differentiate between two basic ways of assessing future inflation: forecast and simulation. A forecast is the most likely picture of the future. In a forecast, all agents are assumed to behave in the most likely way. A simulation, on the other hand, is the most likely picture of the future if the behaviour of one agent follows a predetermined path or is generated using a selected reaction function. The path or reaction function ascribed to the agent does not have to be the most likely one. After differentiating between a forecast and a simulation, we discuss the pros and cons of using the two ways of assessing future inflation on the three abovementioned levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Michal Skorepa & Viktor Kotlan, 2003. "Inflation Targeting: to Forecast or to Simulate," Macroeconomics 0304007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0304007
    Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 19. CNB Internal Research and Policy Note 1/03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mac/papers/0304/0304007.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeffery D. Amato & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 495-503.
    2. Frederic S Mishkin, 2004. "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?," RBA Annual Conference Volume,in: Christopher Kent & Simon Guttmann (ed.), The Future of Inflation Targeting Reserve Bank of Australia.
    3. Sharon McCaw & Satish Ranchhod, 2002. "The Reserve Bank's forecasting performance," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 65, December.
    4. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
    5. Leeper, Eric M. & Zha, Tao, 2003. "Modest policy interventions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1673-1700, November.
    6. Professor Lars E O Svensson, 2001. "Independent review of the operation of monetary policy in New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 64, March.
    7. Hossein Samiei & Jan Kees Martijn, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom," IMF Working Papers 99/170, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-254, April.
    9. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin & Hui Tong, 2006. "Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 453-455, March.
    10. Michal Skořepa & Viktor Kotlán, 2006. "Inflation Targeting: To Forecast or To Simulate?," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2006(4), pages 300-314.
    11. Tim Hampton, 2002. "The role of the Reserve Bank's macro model in the formation of interest rate projections," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 65, June.
    12. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2006. "Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 448-452, March.
    13. Charles A.E. Goodhart, 2001. "Monetary transmission lags and the formulation of the policy decision on interest rates," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 165-186.
    14. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
    15. Leitemo, Kai, 2003. " Targeting Inflation by Constant-Interest-Rate Forecasts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 609-626, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Viktor Kotlán & David Navrátil, 2003. "Inflation Targeting as a Stabilization Tool: Its Design and Performance in the Czech Republic," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 53(5-6), pages 220-242, May.
    2. Michal Skořepa & Viktor Kotlán, 2006. "Inflation Targeting: To Forecast or To Simulate?," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2006(4), pages 300-314.
    3. David Navrátil & Viktor Kotlán, 2005. "Is the CNB Predictable?," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 55(7-8), pages 333-343, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    inflation targeting; forecast; simulation; central bank; decision making; communication;

    JEL classification:

    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0304007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.