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How institutions shape land deals: The role of corruption

Author

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  • Bujko, Matthias
  • Fischer, Christian
  • Krieger, Tim
  • Meierrieks, Daniel

Abstract

Large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Bujko, Matthias & Fischer, Christian & Krieger, Tim & Meierrieks, Daniel, 2014. "How institutions shape land deals: The role of corruption," Discussion Paper Series 2014-02, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:201402
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Toke S. Aidt, 2009. "Corruption, institutions, and economic development," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 271-291, Summer.
    2. Rabah Arezki & Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, 2015. "What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 29(2), pages 207-233.
    3. Rabah Arezki & Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, 2015. "What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 29(2), pages 207-233.
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    Cited by:

    1. Deininger, Klaus & Xia, Fang, 2016. "Quantifying Spillover Effects from Large Land-based Investment: The Case of Mozambique," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 227-241.
    2. Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "Land Grabbing and Ethnic Conflict," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 243-260, October.
    3. Tim Krieger & Martin Leroch, 2016. "The Political Economy of Land Grabbing," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 197-204, October.
    4. Deininger,Klaus W. & Xia,Fang & Mate,Aurelio & Payongayong,Ellen & Deininger,Klaus W. & Xia,Fang & Mate,Aurelio & Payongayong,Ellen, 2015. "Quantifying spillover effects from large farm establishments : the case of Mozambique," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7466, The World Bank.
    5. repec:spr:homoec:v:34:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-017-0035-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Diergarten, Yorck & Krieger, Tim, 2015. "A note on large-scale land acquisitions, commitment problems and international law," Discussion Paper Series 2015-02, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    7. Ahlerup, Pelle & Tengstam, Sven, 2015. "Do the land-poor gain from agricultural investments? Empirical evidence from Zambia using panel data," Working Papers in Economics 624, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    8. Felix Albrecht & Björn Frank & Simone Gobien & Maren Hartmann & Özcan Ihtiyar & Elina Khachatryan & Nataliya Kusa & Ahmed Rashad & Mohamed Ismail Sabry & Sondos Shaheen & Thomas Stöber, 2016. "The Powerful, the Powerless, and the Grabbing: Non-Nash Land Grabbing in the Lab," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 219-242, October.
    9. Scoppola, M. & Raimondi, V., 2018. "Foreign Land Acquisitions and Environmental Regulations: does the Pollution-Haven Hypothesis hold?," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277098, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    10. Antonis M. Koumpias & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega, 2015. "Housing Bubbles and Zoning Corruption: Evidence from Greece and Spain," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1505, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    large-scale land acquisitions; land grabbing; foreign investments; weak institutions; property rights; corruption; large-N study;

    JEL classification:

    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

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