IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wgspdp/201502.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A note on large-scale land acquisitions, commitment problems and international law

Author

Listed:
  • Diergarten, Yorck
  • Krieger, Tim

Abstract

Poorly developed countries with weak institutions often face severe commitment problems. International investors are reluctant to invest in these countries because their property rights are insufficiently protected. We argue that in order to overcome the commitment problem countries may subject investors' rights protection to independent investment tribunals. These tribunals are known to strictly support property rights protection and to be reluctant to honor human rights considerations, although they might be applicable. This may explain why human rights of the local smallholders in large-scale land acquisitions are hardly protected in the Global South.

Suggested Citation

  • Diergarten, Yorck & Krieger, Tim, 2015. "A note on large-scale land acquisitions, commitment problems and international law," Discussion Paper Series 2015-02, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:201502
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/109660/1/823060802.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1994. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(1), pages 81-108.
    2. Rabah Arezki & Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, 2015. "What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 29(2), pages 207-233.
    3. Matthias Bujko & Christian Fischer & Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 205-217, October.
    4. Chris Doyle & Sweder Wijnbergen, 1994. "Taxation of foreign multinationals: A sequential bargaining approach to tax holidays," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(3), pages 211-225, October.
    5. Rabah Arezki & Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, 2015. "What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 29(2), pages 207-233.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tim Krieger & Martin Leroch, 2016. "The Political Economy of Land Grabbing," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 197-204, October.
    2. Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "Land Grabbing and Ethnic Conflict," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 243-260, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    large-scale land acquisitions; land grabbing; law & economics; international law; property rights; commitment problems; foreign investors; weak institutions;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:201502. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/wffrede.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.