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A note on large-scale land acquisitions, commitment problems and international law

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  • Diergarten, Yorck
  • Krieger, Tim

Abstract

Poorly developed countries with weak institutions often face severe commitment problems. International investors are reluctant to invest in these countries because their property rights are insufficiently protected. We argue that in order to overcome the commitment problem countries may subject investors' rights protection to independent investment tribunals. These tribunals are known to strictly support property rights protection and to be reluctant to honor human rights considerations, although they might be applicable. This may explain why human rights of the local smallholders in large-scale land acquisitions are hardly protected in the Global South.

Suggested Citation

  • Diergarten, Yorck & Krieger, Tim, 2015. "A note on large-scale land acquisitions, commitment problems and international law," Discussion Paper Series 2015-02, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:201502
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rabah Arezki & Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, 2015. "What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 29(2), pages 207-233.
    2. Matthias Bujko & Christian Fischer & Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 205-217, October.
    3. Chris Doyle & Sweder Wijnbergen, 1994. "Taxation of foreign multinationals: A sequential bargaining approach to tax holidays," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(3), pages 211-225, October.
    4. Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1994. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(1), pages 81-108.
    5. Rabah Arezki & Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, 2015. "What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 29(2), pages 207-233.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tim Krieger & Martin Leroch, 2016. "The Political Economy of Land Grabbing," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 197-204, October.
    2. Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "Land Grabbing and Ethnic Conflict," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 243-260, October.

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