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Direct foreign investment and expropriation incentives: A mitigating role for match-specific capital

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  • Choi, Yongjae
  • Esfahani, Hadi Salehi

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  • Choi, Yongjae & Esfahani, Hadi Salehi, 1998. "Direct foreign investment and expropriation incentives: A mitigating role for match-specific capital," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 47-59.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:38:y:1998:i:1:p:47-59
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1994. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(1), pages 81-108.
    2. Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1993. "Reputation as a Mechanism Alleviating Opportunistic Host Government Behavior against MNEs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 1-17, March.
    3. Mohtadi, Hamid, 1990. "Expropriation of Multinational Firms: The Role of Domestic Market Conditions and Domestic Rivalries," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 813-830, October.
    4. James R. Markusen, 1995. "The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International Trade," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 169-189, Spring.
    5. Abdalla, Adil E. A., 1991. "An Investigation of Contractual Structure in International Business," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 44(2-3), pages 143-167.
    6. Helleiner, G.K., 1989. "Transnational corporations and direct foreign investment," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 27, pages 1441-1480, Elsevier.
    7. Bond, Eric W. & Samuelson, Larry, 1989. "Bargaining with commitment, choice of techniques, and direct foreign investment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1-2), pages 77-97, February.
    8. Kant, Chander, 1988. "Endogenous transfer pricing and the effects of uncertain regulation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 147-157, February.
    9. Chris Doyle & Sweder Wijnbergen, 1994. "Taxation of foreign multinationals: A sequential bargaining approach to tax holidays," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(3), pages 211-225, October.
    10. Prusa, Thomas J., 1990. "An incentive compatible approach to the transfer pricing problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 155-172, February.
    11. Bond, Eric W & Samuelson, Larry, 1986. "Tax Holidays as Signals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 820-826, September.
    12. Schneider, Friedrich & Frey, Bruno S., 1985. "Economic and political determinants of foreign direct investment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 161-175, February.
    13. Brewer, Thomas L., 1991. "Foreign direct investment in developing countries : patterns, policies, and prospects," Policy Research Working Paper Series 712, The World Bank.
    14. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1987. "Foreign direct investment with unemployment and endogenous taxes and tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3-4), pages 257-279, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalez, P., 1999. "Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability," Papers 99-03, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
    2. Palokangas, Tapio K., 2003. "Foreign Direct Investment, Labour Market Regulation and Self-Interested Governments," IZA Discussion Papers 793, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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