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Gradualism In Tax Treaties With Irreversible Foreign Direct Investment

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Chisik
  • Ronald B. Davies

Abstract

Bilateral tax treaties govern host country taxation for most of the world's foreign direct investment (FDI). To explain why the tax rates used under these treaties are gradually falling we consider two-way capital flows with irreversible FDI. The extent of irreversibility determines the magnitude of initial tax reductions. When Pareto-optimal taxes are not initially self-enforcing, more modest tax reductions generate an increase in irreversible bilateral FDI so that further tax reductions become self-enforcing. Depending on the extent of irreversibility and asymmetry, Pareto-optimal tax rates may be obtainable in the long run. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Chisik & Ronald B. Davies, 2004. "Gradualism In Tax Treaties With Irreversible Foreign Direct Investment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 113-139, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:1:p:113-139
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    Cited by:

    1. Chisik, Richard, 2012. "Trade disputes, quality choice, and economic integration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 47-61.
    2. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Domestic reform as a rationale for gradualism in international cooperation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 400-427, July.
    3. Rixen, Thomas & Rohlfing, Ingo, 2005. "The political economy of bilateralism and multilateralism: Institutional choice in international trade and taxation," TranState Working Papers 31, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
    4. Rixen, Thomas & Rohlfing, Ingo, 2005. "The Political Economy of Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Institutional Choice in Trade and Taxation," MPRA Paper 325, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2005.
    5. Kaushal Kishore, 2016. "Tax Competition, Policy Competition and the Strategic Use of Policy Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investments," Working Papers 201684, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
    6. Abdullah Kumas & Daniel L. Millimet, 2018. "Reassessing the effects of bilateral tax treaties on US FDI activity," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 42(3), pages 451-470, July.
    7. Leibrecht, Markus & Rixen, Thomas, 2020. "Double Tax Avoidance and Tax Competition for Mobile Capital," SocArXiv dgw5k, Center for Open Science.
    8. Rixen, Thomas & Rohlfing, Ingo, 2020. "The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation," SocArXiv uwge8, Center for Open Science.
    9. Wacker, Konstantin M., 2013. "On the measurement of foreign direct investment and its relationship to activities of multinational corporations," Working Paper Series 1614, European Central Bank.
    10. Mauro Ghinamo & Paolo Panteghini & Federico Revelli, 2010. "FDI determination and corporate tax competition in a volatile world," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(5), pages 532-555, October.
    11. Kudła, Janusz & Kopczewska, Katarzyna & Stachowiak-Kudła, Monika, 2023. "Trade, investment and size inequalities between countries and the asymmetry in double taxation agreements," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    12. Ronald B. Davies & Hartmut Egger & Peter Egger, 2010. "Profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 704-727, May.
    13. Matthew Cole & M. Ryan Haley & Aaron Lowen, 2008. "A note on bilateral trade agreements in the presence of irreversible investment and deferred negotiations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(34), pages 1-10.
    14. Austin P. Johnson, 2018. "Global Governance, Tax Treaties, and Credible Commitments," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 181(1), pages 69-98, March.
    15. Haupt, Alexander & Krieger, Tim, 2020. "The role of relocation mobility in tax and subsidy competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    16. West, Ashley & Wilkinson, Brett, 2024. "What do we know about tax treaties and how can accounting research contribute?," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    17. Alexander Haupt & Tim Krieger, 2009. "The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition," Working Papers CIE 21, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    18. Kaushal Kishore, 2016. "Dynamic Inconsistency, Falling Cost of Capital Relocation and Preferential Taxation of Foreign Capital," Working Papers 201633, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
    19. Petr Janský & Jan Láznička & Miroslav Palanský, 2021. "Tax treaties worldwide: Estimating elasticities and revenue foregone," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 359-401, May.
    20. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2008:i:34:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Alan C. Spearot, 2013. "Market Access, Investment, And Heterogeneous Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(2), pages 601-627, May.
    22. Egger, Peter & Pfaffermayr, Michael, 2004. "The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 788-804, December.
    23. Ronald B. Davies & Hartmut Egger & Peter Egger, 2003. "Tax Competition for International Producers and the Mode of Foreign Market Entry," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2006-19, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 10 Jun 2003.
    24. Kunka Petkova & Andrzej Leszek Stasio & Martin Zagler, 2020. "Bilateral Tax Competition and Regional Spillovers in Tax Treaty Formation," JRC Working Papers on Taxation & Structural Reforms 2020-07, Joint Research Centre.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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