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The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation

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  • Rixen, Thomas

    (Freie Universität Berlin)

  • Rohlfing, Ingo

    (Universität zu Köln)

Abstract

Postprint. Please cite as: Rixen, Thomas and Ingo Rohlfing (2007) The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation, International Negotiation 12 (3), 389-414. https://doi.org/10.1163/138234007X240718

Suggested Citation

  • Rixen, Thomas & Rohlfing, Ingo, 2020. "The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation," SocArXiv uwge8, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:uwge8
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/uwge8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Genschel, Philipp, 2005. "Globalisation and the transformation of the tax state," TranState Working Papers 10, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
    2. Chisik, Richard & Davies, Ronald B., 2004. "Asymmetric FDI and tax-treaty bargaining: theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1119-1148, June.
    3. Tollison, Robert D. & Willett, Thomas D., 1979. "An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 425-449, October.
    4. Ruggie, John Gerard, 1982. "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 379-415, April.
    5. Richard Chisik & Ronald B. Davies, 2004. "Gradualism In Tax Treaties With Irreversible Foreign Direct Investment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 113-139, February.
    6. Pahre, Robert, 2001. "Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 859-890, October.
    7. Milner, Helen V. & Yoffie, David B., 1989. "Between free trade and protectionism: strategic trade policy and a theory of corporate trade demands," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 239-272, April.
    8. Sebenius, James K., 1983. "Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 281-316, April.
    9. Hillman, Arye L, 1984. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives: Errata," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 260-260, March.
    10. Genschel, Phillip, 2005. "3 Globalization and the transformation of the tax state," European Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(S1), pages 53-71, March.
    11. Ronald B. Davies, 2004. "Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential versus Performance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(6), pages 775-802, November.
    12. Mansfield, Edward D. & Milner, Helen V., 1999. "The New Wave of Regionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 589-627, July.
    13. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-1187, December.
    14. Kwang-Yeol Yoo, 2003. "Corporate Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment Income 1991-2001," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 365, OECD Publishing.
    15. Drezner, Daniel W., 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 73-102, January.
    16. John Whalley, 2001. "Puzzles Over International Taxation of Cross Border Flows of Capital Income," NBER Working Papers 8662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Reinsberg,Bernhard Wilfried & Michaelowa,Katharina & Knack,Stephen, 2015. "Which donors, which funds ? the choice of multilateral funds by bilateral donors at the World Bank," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7441, The World Bank.
    2. Rixen, Thomas, 2008. "Politicization and institutional (non-) change in international taxation [Politisierung und institutioneller (Nicht-)Wandel des internationalen Steuerregimes]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2008-306, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    3. Lora Anne Viola, 2020. "US Strategies of Institutional Adaptation in the Face of Hegemonic Decline," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11(S3), pages 28-39, October.
    4. Dirk De Bièvre & Emile van Ommeren, 2021. "Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Institutional Choice: The Political Economy of Regime Complexes in International Trade Policy," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(S4), pages 14-24, May.

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