IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/intorg/v54y2000i01p73-102_44.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?

Author

Listed:
  • Drezner, Daniel W.

Abstract

Scholars and policymakers generally assume that multilateral cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to be of any use. However, previous statistical tests of this assumption have shown that sanctions are more successful with lower levels of cooperation. This puzzle calls into question established theories of economic statecraft as well as theories of international cooperation. In this article I test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on sanctions events using James Fearon's (1998) breakdown of cooperation into bargaining and enforcement phases as a framework for discussion The empirical results show that when multilateral economic sanctions fail, their failure is due to enforcement, not bargaining problems Without the support of an international organization, cooperating states backslide from promises of cooperation Backsliding occurs because of domestic political pressures and uncertainty about the intentions of the other sanctioning countries; backsliding causes an initial burst of cooperative behavior to decay over time. Without institutional support, cooperation is worse than useless—it is counterproductive. This result suggests that international cooperation is a more fragile equilibrium than previously thought but undercuts realist arguments that international organizations are unimportant.

Suggested Citation

  • Drezner, Daniel W., 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(01), pages 73-102, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:54:y:2000:i:01:p:73-102_44
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818300440956
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Caruso Raul, 2003. "The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-36, April.
    2. repec:kap:iecepo:v:14:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10368-017-0376-4 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Rixen, Thomas, 2008. "The institutional design of international double taxation avoidance
      [Das Design der internationalen Institutionen zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2008-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    4. Denise Guthrie & Erick Duchesne, 2003. "(Mis)Selection Effects and Sovereignty Costs: An Alternative Measure of the Costs of Sanctions," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20032, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    5. Zornitsa Kutlina-Dimitrova, 2017. "The economic impact of the Russian import ban: a CGE analysis," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 537-552, October.
    6. Jiawen Yang & Hossein Askari & John Forrer & Lili Zhu, 2009. "How Do US Economic Sanctions Affect EU's Trade with Target Countries?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(8), pages 1223-1244, August.
    7. Scott Helfstein, 2012. "Liabilities of Globalization: Sovereign Debt, International Investors and Interstate Conflict with Other People's Money," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 277-288, December.
    8. Brzoska Michael, 2008. "Measuring the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-34, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:54:y:2000:i:01:p:73-102_44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters). General contact details of provider: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_INO .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.