The institutional design of international double taxation avoidance
[Das Design der internationalen Institutionen zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung]
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Abstract
Suggested Citation
[Das Design der internationalen Institutionen zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2008-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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Other versions of this item:
- Rixen, Thomas, 2008. "The institutional Design of international double Taxation Avoidance," MPRA Paper 8322, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Chisik, Richard & Davies, Ronald B., 2004.
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- repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:04:p:923-942_23 is not listed on IDEAS
- Rixen, Thomas, 2008.
"The institutional design of international double taxation avoidance
[Das Design der internationalen Institutionen zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2008-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).- Rixen, Thomas, 2008. "The institutional Design of international double Taxation Avoidance," MPRA Paper 8322, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- McIntyre, Michael J., 1993. "Guidelines for Taxing International Capital Flows: The Legal Perspective," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 46(3), pages 315-321, September.
- Abbott, Kenneth W. & Snidal, Duncan, 2000. "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(03), pages 421-456, June.
- Hartman, David G., 1985. "Tax policy and foreign direct investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 107-121, February.
- Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(04), pages 761-799, September.
- David G. Hartman, 1982. "Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States," NBER Working Papers 0967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
- Rixen, Thomas, 2008.
"The institutional design of international double taxation avoidance
[Das Design der internationalen Institutionen zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2008-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).- Rixen, Thomas, 2008. "The institutional Design of international double Taxation Avoidance," MPRA Paper 8322, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
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