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Auctions and trading in energy markets -- an economic analysis

  • Newbery, D.
  • Tanga McDaniel

Auctions are playing an increasingly prominent role in the planning and operation of energy markets. Comparing the New Electricity Trading Arrangements to the former electricity Pool in England and Wales requires some analysis of the relative merits of uniform versus discriminatory pricing rules, and use of the gas network in Britain and electricity interconnectors around Europe is allocated on the basis of auction results. In this paper we discuss the changes in the trading arrangements in the electricity industry in England and Wales as well as some of the results to date. We also look at the wider issue of using auctions to replace regulation by market solutions for managing the natural monopolies in energy markets.

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File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp/ep15.pdf
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0233.

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Length: 24
Date of creation: Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0233
Note: CMI IO
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

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  1. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Tanga McDaniel, 2002. "Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 520.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Economics Series Working Papers 1999-W12, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. McDaniel, T., 2003. "Auctioning access to networks: evidence and expectations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 33-38, March.
  4. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 1196, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Tanga McDaniel & Neuhoff, K., 2002. "Auctions to gas transmission access: The British experience," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0234, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  6. Rassenti, Stephen J & Smith, Vernon L & Wilson, Bart J, 2003. "Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 109-23, March.
  7. Newbery, D. M., 1997. "Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9707, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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