IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juipol/v11y2003i3p155-167.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Failing electricity markets: should we shoot the pools?

Author

Listed:
  • Green, Richard

Abstract

This Paper discusses the electricity reforms in California and in England and Wales. In both cases, a centralized spot market played a major role, and both markets have now been abolished. This Paper argues that their disappearance is not evidence that future electricity restructuring should avoid the use of spot markets. Instead, the problems in England and Wales were largely due to market power. In California, problems arising from market power and a tightening demand-supply balance were turned into a disaster because the spot market had not been backed up by hedging contracts.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Green, Richard, 2003. "Failing electricity markets: should we shoot the pools?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 155-167, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:11:y:2003:i:3:p:155-167
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957-1787(03)00045-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joanne Evans & Richard Green, 2003. "Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998?," Working Papers EP26, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    2. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter.
    3. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1999. "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 805-826, September.
    4. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1998. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 703-725, Winter.
    5. David Newbery & Tanga McDaniel, 2002. "Auctions and trading in energy markets - an economic analysis," Working Papers EP15, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    6. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    7. Green, Richard, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 107-124, March.
    8. Charles Goldman & Galen Barbose & Joseph Eto, 2002. "California Customer Load Reductions during the Electricity Crisis: Did They Help to Keep the Lights On?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 113-142, June.
    9. John Bower & Derek W. Bunn, 2000. "Model-Based Comparisons of Pool and Bilateral Markets for Electricity," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 1-29.
    10. Stoft, Steven, 1997. "What should a power marketer want?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 34-45, June.
    11. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, 1976. "Peak Load Pricing with a Diverse Technology," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 207-231, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Amobi, Marilyn Chikaodili, 2007. "Deregulating the electricity industry in Nigeria: Lessons from the British reform," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 291-304, December.
    2. Brennan, Timothy J. & Palmer, Karen L. & Martinez, Salvador A., 2001. "Implementing Electricity Restructuring: Policies, Potholes, and Prospects," Discussion Papers 10508, Resources for the Future.
    3. Gore, Olga & Viljainen, Satu & Makkonen, Mari & Kuleshov, Dmitry, 2012. "Russian electricity market reform: Deregulation or re-regulation?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 676-685.
    4. Woo, C.K. & King, M. & Tishler, A. & Chow, L.C.H., 2006. "Costs of electricity deregulation," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 747-768.
    5. Thomas, Steve, 2006. "The British Model in Britain: Failing slowly," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 583-600, March.
    6. Timothy Brennan & Karen Palmer & Salvador Martinez, 2002. "Implementing Electricity Restructuring," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 99-132, June.
    7. Singh, Anoop & Jamasb, Tooraj & Nepal, Rabindra & Toman, Michael, 2018. "Electricity cooperation in South Asia: Barriers to cross-border trade," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 741-748.
    8. Aitor Ciarreta & María Espinosa, 2010. "Market power in the Spanish electricity auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 42-69, February.
    9. René Aïd, 2008. "Long-term risk management for utility companies: the next challenges," Working Papers hal-00409030, HAL.
    10. Sherzod N. Tashpulatov, 2018. "The Impact of Behavioral and Structural Remedies on Electricity Prices: The Case of the England and Wales Electricity Market," Energies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(12), pages 1-24, December.
    11. Perez, Eloy, 2007. "A model of vertical integration and investment in generation capacity in electricity markets: The case of the bidding game," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 272-290, December.
    12. Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor & Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos, 2005. "Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market," DFAEII Working Papers 2005-02, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    13. Singh, Anoop, 2010. "Towards a competitive market for electricity and consumer choice in the Indian power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 4196-4208, August.
    14. Jiao, Jian-Ling & Ge, Hong-Zhen & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2010. "Impact analysis of China's coal-electricity price linkage mechanism: Results from a game model," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 574-588, July.
    15. J. Robert Branston & Roger Sugden & Pedro Valdez & James Wilson, 2006. "Generating Participation and Democracy: An Illustration from Electricity Reform in Mexico," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 47-68.
    16. Dijk, Justin & Willems, Bert, 2011. "The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 1764-1773, March.
    17. Ferdinand E. Banks, 2005. "An Unsympathetic Lecture on Economic Theory and the Deregulation of Natural Gas," Energy & Environment, , vol. 16(2), pages 303-319, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Crawford, Gregory S. & Crespo, Joseph & Tauchen, Helen, 2007. "Bidding asymmetries in multi-unit auctions: Implications of bid function equilibria in the British spot market for electricity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1233-1268, December.
    2. Green, Richard, 2006. "Market power mitigation in the UK power market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 76-89, June.
    3. Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005. "Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April.
    4. de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Rubin, Ofir D. & Babcock, Bruce A., 2011. "A novel approach for modeling deregulated electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2711-2721, May.
    6. Aitor Ciarreta & María Espinosa, 2010. "Market power in the Spanish electricity auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 42-69, February.
    7. Lízal, Lubomír M. & Tashpulatov, Sherzod N., 2014. "Do producers apply a capacity cutting strategy to increase prices? The case of the England and Wales electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 114-124.
    8. Meunier, Guy, 2010. "Capacity choice, technology mix and market power," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1306-1315, November.
    9. Paizs, László & Mészáros, Mátyás Tamás, 2003. "Piachatalmi problémák modellezése a dereguláció utáni magyar áramtermelő piacon [Modelling problems of market power on the Hungarian electricity-generation market after deregulation]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 735-764.
    10. Weigt, H. & Willems, Bert, 2011. "The Effect of Divestitures in the German Electricity Market," Other publications TiSEM 7bbea5b0-7489-416f-8767-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Anderson, Edward J. & Hu, Xinmin, 2008. "Forward contracts and market power in an electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 679-694, May.
    12. Tashpulatov, Sherzod N., 2015. "Analysis of electricity industry liberalization in Great Britain: How did the bidding behavior of electricity producers change?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 24-34.
    13. Guy Meunier, 2011. "Imperfect Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Some Lessons from Theoretical Models," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon & Adrien de Hauteclocque (ed.),Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Desmond Cai & Anish Agarwal & Adam Wierman, 2020. "On the Inefficiency of Forward Markets in Leader–Follower Competition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 35-52, January.
    15. Tamaschke, R. & Docwra, G. & Stillman, R., 2005. "Measuring market power in electricity generation: A long-term perspective using a programming model," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 317-335, March.
    16. Rubin, Ofir David, 2010. "Equilibrium pricing in electricity markets with wind power," ISU General Staff Papers 201001010800002361, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    17. Frederic Murphy & Yves Smeers, 2010. "On the Impact of Forward Markets on Investments in Oligopolistic Markets with Reference to Electricity," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(3), pages 515-528, June.
    18. Newbery, David M. & Greve, Thomas, 2017. "The strategic robustness of oligopoly electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 124-132.
    19. Fiuza de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo & Daglish, Toby, 2016. "Can market power in the electricity spot market translate into market power in the hedge market?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 11-26.
    20. Karakatsani, Nektaria V. & Bunn, Derek W., 2008. "Forecasting electricity prices: The impact of fundamentals and time-varying coefficients," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 764-785.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:11:y:2003:i:3:p:155-167. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Haili He). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30478 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.