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Prices as Indicators of Scarcity: An Experimental Study of a Multistage Auction

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  • Tanga McDaniel
  • Andreas Nicklisch

Abstract

The price mecanism is the primary means of information transfer in decentralized economic systems. High prices indicate high demand, whereas low prices indicate low demand. Thus prices are the signals for accelerating or slowing production. However, using sequential, multi-unit auctions, we show that the price mechanism fails to be beneficial for producers in every case. As an example we discuss auctions for future access rights to a network. We use experiments to show that the incentives for free-riding inherent in auctions for future access provide inaccurate signals for investment.
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Suggested Citation

  • Tanga McDaniel & Andreas Nicklisch, 2004. "Prices as Indicators of Scarcity: An Experimental Study of a Multistage Auction," Working Papers 04-18, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:04-18
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tanga McDaniel & Karsten Neuhoff, 2002. "Use of long-term auctions for network investment," Working Papers EP04, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    2. Tibor Neugebauer & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2003. "Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: a Laboratory Analysis," Working Papers 24, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. David Newbery & Tanga McDaniel, 2002. "Auctions and trading in energy markets - an economic analysis," Working Papers EP15, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    4. Tanga McDaniel & Karsten Neuhoff, 2002. "Auctions to gas transmission access: The British experience," Working Papers EP06, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    5. McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1997. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 246-276, February.
    6. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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