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Citations of
Raphael Soubeyran

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Francis Bloch & Santiago S?chez-Pag? & Raphael Soubeyran, . "When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflD72icts," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 543.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "Stable Alliance Formation in Distributional Conflict," Public Economics 0305001, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2003. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2002. "Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict," Economics Working Papers 645, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Public Economics 0312005, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 2004. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. Francis Bloch & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2006. "When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 3-29, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Moral hazard and free riding in collective action," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 197-219, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests," ESE Discussion Papers 158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Francis Bloch, 2009. "Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts," Working Papers hal-00435387_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2010-1-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.