1. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1995. "Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 336-67, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-82, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Aghion, P. & Dewatripont, M. & Rey, P., 1989. "Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information," Papers 8912, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques-.
   • Aghion, P. & Dewatripont, M. & Rey, P., 1992. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Papers 9302, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques-.
3. Chiappori, Pierre Andre & Salanie, Bernard, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
4. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2002. "The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 1-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Edlin, Aaron S & Hermalin, Benjamin E, 2000. "Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 395-423, October.
6. Masten, Scott E & Crocker, Keith J, 1985. "Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1083-93, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Crawford, Vincent P, 1988. "Long-term Relationships Governed by Short-term Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 485-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Vincent P. Crawford, 1986. "Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts," Working Papers 585, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
8. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1993. "Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 303-23, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Gerard Llobet & Hugo Hopenhayn & Matthew F. Mitchell, 2000. "Rewarding sequential innovators: prizes, patents and buyouts," Staff Report 273, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Llobet, G. & Hopenhayn, H. & Mitchell, M., 2000. "Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts," Papers 0012, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
   • Gerard Llobet & Hugo Hopenhayn & Matthew Mitchell, 2003. "Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000682, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Hugo Hopenhayn & Gerard Llobet & Matthew Mitchell, 2006. "Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents, and Buyouts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1041-1068, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Georg Nöldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1992. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Paper Serie A 417, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1993.
    Other versions:
    • Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 163-179, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Working papers 442, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
12. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
13. Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1990. "Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment in Contracting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 597-619, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1993. "Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transactions Cost Explanation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 937-76, October.
15. Yeon-Koo Che & József Sákovics, 2004. "A Dynamic Theory of Holdup," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1063-1103, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "A Dynamic Theory of Holdup," ESE Discussion Papers 74, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
16. Pitchford, Rohan & Snyder, Christopher M., 2004. "A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 88-103, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Goldberg, Victor P & Erickson, John R, 1987. "Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 369-98, October.
19. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
20. Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Harris, Milton & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1987. "On the Duration of Agreements," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 389-406, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Coase, R H, 2000. "The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 15-31, April.
23. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1155, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," NBER Working Papers 5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1991. "Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 232-240, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, 1988. "Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 327-343, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Sergei Guriev, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1048-1048. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Lockwood, Ben & Thomas, Jonathan P, 2002. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(2), pages 339-56, April.
    Other versions:
    • Lockwood, B. & Thomas, J.P., 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 550, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Ben Lockwood & Jonathan Thomas, 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 9909, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews. [Downloadable!]
    • Lockwood, B. & Thomas, J.P., 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 525, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Ben Lockwood & Jonathan P. Thomas, 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," CSGR Working papers series 28/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.

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1. CRÉMER, Jacques & KHALIL, Fahad, 1991. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," IDEI Working Papers 5, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991. "Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract," Working Papers 91-16, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
   • Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991. "Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-16, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
   • Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-78, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Matthew Ellman, 2006. "The Optimal Length of Contracts with Application to Outsourcing," Economics Working Papers 965, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]