Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
AbstractDoes a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent works answer by the affirmative (Groseclose 1999, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, Aragones and Palfrey 2002, 2003). We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods). ...French Abstract : Cet article traite de l'entrée dans une industrie dans laquelle les firmes partagent une réputation collective. Premièrement, nous montrons que l'entrée libre n'est pas socialement optimale, il existe un besoin de régulation à travers l'imposition d'un standard minimum de qualité (par exemple). Deuxièmement, nous montrons qu'un standard minimum de qualité peut inciter des firmes à entrer sur le marché. Contrairement à la pensée commune, un standard minimum de qualité ne doit pas être toujours considéré comme une barrière à l'entrée.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UMR MOISA : Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs : CIHEAM-IAMM, CIRAD, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro, IRD - Montpellier, France in its series Working Papers MOISA with number 200801.
Date of creation: 2008
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CANDIDATE QUALITY; EXTREMISM; PUBLIC GOODS CONSUMPTION;
Other versions of this item:
- Raphaël SOUBEYRAN, 2009. "Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 93-94, pages 327-348.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2008-05-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-05-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2008-05-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2008-05-05 (Positive Political Economics)
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