Heterogeneous efforts in voluntary programmes on food safety
AbstractIn this article, we discuss the efforts made by importers of fresh produce within a voluntary programme on food safety. We show theoretically that the larger the firms the lower their efforts directed at food safety. We test this proposition using original primary data from a voluntary programme implemented by French importers of fresh produce. Our results contrast with evidence from environmental economics that large firms are more likely to be proactive with respect to environmental safeguards. Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2010; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email email@example.com, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics in its journal European Review of Agricultural Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Rouviere, Elodie & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2012. "Small is Beautiful? Firm's Size, Prevention & Food Safety," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 123410, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
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