Small is Beautiful? Firm's Size, Prevention & Food Safety
AbstractThe European General Food Law of 2005 and the newly promulgated FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FFSMA) of 2010 ask all food operators to implement preventive efforts. In this article, we explore the link between firm’s size and preventive efforts. We show two main results. First, when there is no cross-contamination, small firms will provide higher preventive efforts than large firms. When there is crosscontamination, the effort-size curve may have a "inverted-U" shape. From our results we can argue that when implementing or enforcing food safety regulations, public authorities should consider both firms size and food safety hazard.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its series 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington with number 123410.
Date of creation: 14 May 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC
prevention effort; firm size; food safety; Agribusiness; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; Risk and Uncertainty; Q18; L15; L5;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pouliot, Sebastien & Sumner, Daniel A., 2006.
"Traceability, Liability and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality,"
2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA
21121, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Sébastien Pouliot & Daniel A. Sumner, 2008. "Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(1), pages 15-27.
- Pouliot, Sebastien & Sumner, Daniel A., 2010. "Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality," Staff General Research Papers 32126, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- DACHRAOUI, Kaïs & DIONNE, Georges & EECKHOUDT, Louis & GODFROID, Philippe, .
"Comparative mixed risk aversion: definition and application to self-protection and willingness to pay,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1835, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kaïs Dachraoui & Georges Dionne & Louis Eeckhoudt & Philippe Godfroid, 2004. "Comparative Mixed Risk Aversion: Definition and Application to Self-Protection and Willingness to Pay," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 261-276, December.
- S. Andrew Starbird, 2005. "Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(1), pages 15-27.
- Elodie Rouviere & Raphael Soubeyran & Céline Bignebat, 2010. "Heterogeneous efforts in voluntary programmes on food safety," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 37(4), pages 479-499, December.
- Pouliot, Sebastien, 2011. "The FDA Food Safety and Modernization Act and the Exemption for Small Firms," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103885, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Starbird, S. Andrew & Amanor-Boadu, Vincent, 2006. "Do Inspection and Traceability Provide Incentives for Food Safety?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 31(01), April.
- Menegatti, Mario, 2009.
"Optimal prevention and prudence in a two-period model,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 393-397, November.
- M. Menegatti, 2008. "Optimal prevention and prudence in a two-period model," Economics Department Working Papers 2008-EP03, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
- Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug..
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.