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Laboratory experiments on corruption

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
  2. Makowsky, Michael D. & Wang, Siyu, 2018. "Embezzlement, whistleblowing, and organizational architecture: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 58-75.
  3. Sarah Mansour & Vjollca Sadiraj & Sally Wallace, 2014. "Political Institutions and Corruption:An Experimental Examination of the "Right to Recall"," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2014-05, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  4. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
  5. Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, 2010. "Deterrence and constrained enforcement: Alternative regimes to deal with bribery," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-60-10, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  6. Parra, Daniel, 2020. "The Role of Suggestions and Tips in Distorting a Third Party’s Decision," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 11(2), pages 1-21.
  7. Alexandra Christöfl & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger & Arleta Rasmußen, 2017. "An experimental study on bribes, detection probability and principal witness policy," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 87(8), pages 1067-1081, November.
  8. Martin Fochmann & Björn Jahnke & Andreas Wagener, 2019. "Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(3), pages 434-458, July.
  9. van Veldhuizen, R., 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 341-356.
  10. Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, 2008. "Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-26, CIRANO.
  11. Danila Serra, 2012. "Combining Top-Down and Bottom-Up Accountability: Evidence from a Bribery Experiment," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 569-587, August.
  12. Fahr, René & Djawadi, Behnud Mir, 2012. "The impact of risk perception and risk attitudes on corrupt behavior: Evidence from a petty corruption experiment," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62022, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  13. Jun Goto & Takashi Kurosaki & Yuko Mori, 2022. "Distance to news: how social media information affects bribe-giving in India," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 179-209, January.
  14. Vivi Alatas & Lisa Cameron & Ananish Chaudhuri & Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan, 2009. "Gender, Culture, and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(3), pages 663-680, January.
  15. Amadou Boly & Robert Gillanders & Topi Miettinen, 2016. "Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making: An experimental analysis," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-137, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  16. Markussen, Thomas & Putterman, Louis & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2016. "Judicial error and cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 372-388.
  17. Abbink, Klaus & Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Gangadharan, Lata & Jain, Tarun, 2014. "Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 17-28.
  18. Nick Feltovich & Yasuyo Hamaguchi, 2018. "The Effect of Whistle‐Blowing Incentives on Collusion: An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(4), pages 1024-1049, April.
  19. Nina Bobkova & Henrik Egbert, 2012. "Corruption Investigated in the Lab: A Survey of the Experimental Literature," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 2(4), pages 337-337.
  20. Simona Andreea Apostu & Valentina Vasile & Cristina Veres, 2021. "Externalities of Lean Implementation in Medical Laboratories. Process Optimization vs. Adaptation and Flexibility for the Future," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(23), pages 1-22, November.
  21. Raymundo M. Campos-Vazquez & Luis A. Mejia, 2016. "Does corruption affect cooperation? A laboratory experiment," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, December.
  22. Björn Frank & Johann Graf Lambsdorff & Frédéric Boehm, 2011. "Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 23(1), pages 59-71, February.
  23. Amadou Boly & Robert Gillanders & Topi Miettinen, 2016. "Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making: An experimental analysis," WIDER Working Paper Series 137, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  24. Abigail Barr & Danila Serra, 2009. "The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 488-503, December.
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