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Does the Reliability of Institutions Affect Public Good Contributions? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

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  • Fochmann, Martin
  • Jahnke, Bjoern
  • Wagener, Andreas

Abstract

Reliable institutions - i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep - foment cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that "the system" had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that only learned that the attempt did not affect their payoffs or that were not at all exposed to corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Fochmann, Martin & Jahnke, Bjoern & Wagener, Andreas, 2016. "Does the Reliability of Institutions Affect Public Good Contributions? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-570, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    • Handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-570
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Morale and public goods: some unsurprising research
      by Nicholas Gruen in Club Troppo on 2017-03-12 16:27:55

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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